Επιστημονικό άρθρο του Δρα Γιάννος Χαραλαμπίδης (ΡΩΣΙΚΗ ΑΝΑΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΙΚΗ ΣΕ ΑΝΟΔΟ;) στο διεθνές επιστημονικό περιοδικό Strategic Analysis όπου δημοσιεύεται υψηλής ποιότητας πρωτότυπη και αξιολογημένη έρευνα. Ένα από τα ελάχιστα περιοδικά στρατηγικής ανάλυσης διεθνώς (26/06/2022).

A Russian Revisionist Strategy on the Rise? – Yiannos Charalambides

Abstract: This article deals with the Russian Revisionist Strategy, the redistribution of power and the changes that this policy might bring. Accordingly, it examines whether this hypothesis is correct. NATO’s policy and the wars in Crimea, Georgia, Syria and the current one in Ukraine are the case studies that the article analyses. It discusses how Russia aims to restructure the regional and global system by forming strategic arcs and ‘pincer movements’ from the North Sea to the Middle East via the Caucasus Region. The war in Ukraine is at the epicentre of the Russian revisionist strategy.
Introduction

In 1995, Richard Holbrooke, the late American diplomat, wrote an article titled ‘America: A European Power’ (1). It was a strategic piece in line with Realism, explaining that the US was a state which was destined to dominate Europe. Years later, the US remains the prevailing Global Power in a multipolar international system, where Russia aspires to play a reinforced leading role in establishing a new state of affairs, particularly in Europe(2). The war in Ukraine serves exactly to prove the point.

As Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and other scholars have explained, there are two types of states; those that support an existing status quo—defensive Realism—and those that pursue to revise it—offensive Realism (3). Thus, Russia has put forward a revisionist strategy that is worth examining in-depth, as its political ambitions can give rise to structural changes and affect the stability of the regional and global system. The war in Ukraine is a tangible case that subserves the geopolitical ambitions and risks that Russia
takes in the context of its revisionist strategy (4).

The aim of the article

This article examines how Russia is attempting to realize (4) its revisionist strategy by altering the existing legal and geopolitical status quo, thus redefining its relations with other states and Great or Regional Powers. Through a geopolitical analysis, it attempts to find out whether the Russian strategy is a revisionist one—whether the hypothesis is indeed correct. Hence, I look into those significant historical incidents which define the Russian strategy. Such incidents are the wars in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine that Russia conducted and still conducts. These wars are based on the strategic steps taken by the Kremlin in terms of conceivable arcs and ‘pincers’ extending from Russia’s borders in Europe to the Middle East through the Caucasus Region.
Imperial consciousness

Russia is a nation-state with a rich history and experience in International Relations and therefore it applies a foreign policy stemming from its imperial consciousness and military strength which is in turn fuelled by the substantial national income flowing from its gas and oil resources (5). The Kremlin’s strategy follows several directions including Europe, the Caucasus Region, the Arctic Region (6) and the Middle East. Russia is at the core of the Heartland and its policy extends to the entire region of Eurasia (7) with Europe being at the epicentre of historical incidents while Ukraine proves to be an ostensive case for examining Russian foreign policy and strategy. It is a pivotal state that has always been a ‘buffer and flammable zone’ between Russia on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other. Since the end of the Cold War, Ukraine has been facing acute political instability balancing between Russian and Western influence.
The fall of Crimea

Beyond the Orange Revolution (November 2004-January 2005) and Revolution of Dignity (November 2013-February 2014), on 22 and 23 February 2014, Russian troops moved into Crimea through Novorossiysk. On 27 February, they launched a military operation to conquer the Crimean Peninsula and raised the Russian flag on
the official buildings signalising their victory and that, henceforth, a new status quo exists. The Kremlin used the Russian national consciousness of the local population as a strategic instrument to serve and achieve its national goals. The Russophones of Ukraine turned into a lever of pressure over Kyiv and a direct message of what the next Russian strategic step would be. The Russian revisionist strategy was based on:

1. Historical arguments that Crimea was always a Russian land offered by Nikita Khrushchev on 19 February 1954, as a gift to his Ukrainian compatriots. On 25 June 2015, the Russian Constitutional Court ruled that the legal basis of the relevant decision taken by the Soviets to justify their policy in Crimea was unconstitutional ( 8 ).

2. International Law and the right to self-determination which is enshrined in Article 1 Paragraph 2 of the UN Charter.
On 17 March 2014, the indigenous and lawful population of Crimea conducted a Referendum and voted to join Russia (9). The result of the Referendum was never accepted by the International Community and the UN (10). Crimea is not only a historical region that Moscow always sought an excuse to bring under its sovereignty, but was also considered to be a crucial part of the Russian geopolitical and geostrategic ‘living space’. Within this ‘living space’, the territorial waters of Ukraine and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are included (see map 3).

Geopolitical changes and strategic bridgeheads

What remains to be examined are the consequences and the geopolitical changes that the Russian strategy in the Crimea crisis has brought about. Accordingly, I underline the following:

1. Although one can argue that the annexation of Crimea by Russia is illegal, the rules of military power turn Crimea into a de facto part of the Russian territorial integrity.

2. Russia improved and enhanced its geopolitical and geostrategic position at the regional level. It altered the borders of its territorial waters and EEZ. The geopolitical changes resulting from the annexation of Crimea to Russia are apparent, and maps 1 and 2 show how Russia attempts to expand its EEZ and its ‘living space’. After the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine lost a vast part of its EEZ, and Russia shares the largest part of the Black Sea with Turkey (See
map 3). The UN Assembly does not recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia. However, as Russia possessed military strength it was able to impose its strategic goal, whilst both NATO and the EU did not have a reliable preventive strategy to implement when the crisis erupted. From both the historical and military point of view, Crimea is a significant region for the Russian security system. In light of the aforementioned, it is obvious how Moscow put into practice its revisionist strategy by changing the legal and geopolitical relations among itself, its neighbouring countries and other Great Powers such as the EU and the US. This estimate has been verified by the strategic movements taken by Russia in the Russo-Ukrainian War that started on 24 February 2022. Hence, Crimea became a strategic bridgehead for the Russian troops offering the opportunity to take over the south coast with the aim of rendering Ukraine a landlocked state. That is to say, Russia was in the position to form a strategic ‘pincer’ that started from the Russophone region of Ukraine and ended up in Transnistria, passing through Mariupol and Odessa, encompassing the Azov Sea.

3. Henceforth, the Kremlin exercised a permanent political influence and increased its control on the Southeastern region of Ukraine where the strategic instrument of the Russophone population resides. This specific region was like an open wound that Moscow exploited to apply added pressure on Kyiv depending on the circumstances. On 24 February 2022, the Russophone regions of Donetsk and Luhansk appeared to be the apple of discord and the pretext for the Russian troops to invade Ukraine. It was another bridgehead that facilitated the military operations of the new Russian revisionist leap.
The two maps below show how Russia attempts to alter the legal and geopolitical status quo among itself, Ukraine and other neighbouring states by using force in the context of its revisionist strategy. It is apparent how Russia changed the EEZ after the annexation of Crimea.

Russian strategic arcs in Europe and ‘pincer movements’

Further to the aforementioned, another question should be answered: What did the military victory in Crimea offer to Russia from a strategic perspective? In this regard, the Russian strategy in Europe should be viewed through the broader geopolitical spectrum, which is, also depicted in the current Ukrainian War. All the strategic steps, which had been taken by the Kremlin, compose a significant geopolitical and security puzzle. Russia has already formed three geopolitical and strategic arcs. The first begins from the East and through the Southern region of the Ukrainian borders, stretches over Crimea and ends up in Moldova and Transnistria (see map 3). The Russian strategy comprises another two arcs aligned with Russia’s geopolitical, strategic and security interests in the North Sea as well as Eastern and Central Europe. It is relevant to the
Russian security system in the North Sea, where Russian energy interests are at stake, mainly due to Nord Stream 1 and 2. These two pipelines are the alternative routes that Russia opted to use, along with the Turkish Stream, to bypass the Ukrainian energy corridor. Each pipeline is not only a tube channelling gas but also a project which serves economic interests. Although the war in Ukraine negated the energy plans and particularly the operation of Nord Strea 2, what remains alive is the security issue. Therefore, Russian control over Belarus creates an internal arc stretching from Saint Petersburg to the Polish borders. Simultaneously, a third outer arc is established and extends from Saint Petersburg to Kaliningrad, a military stronghold of utmost strategic importance to the Russian Aeronautical Forces. These two arcs share a joint apex lying at Saint Petersburg and, therefore, it is obvious that the formulation of a strategic ‘pincer movement’ around the Baltic States is ready to squash them in case of crisis and conflict (see map 3). This geopolitical reality presents a prominent picture of Russian security which constitutes a part of its revisionist strategy. The Russian threat is always reflected in the central military front, which lies along the Russian borders with the rest of Europe. This is the region where the main bulk of the Russian forces is concentrated and targets Finland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and Eastern Europe (see map 4). Some units of these forces have been used by the Russian Army in the ‘Special Military Operation’ (11) launched by the Kremlin against Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Moreover, map 4 illustrates how Russia can undertake a likely offensive action against NATO member-states in Central Europe. Moscow pursues to expand its sphere of influence where the frontiers of the Soviet Union had been mapped out or close to them.
Map 3 below depicts the Russian security system that is formed by arcs and ‘pincer movements’ and stretches from the Baltic States to the Middle East via the Caucasus region. The array of military forces and the main front between Russia and Europe can be seen in map 4.

Map 4 below shows whether a threat exists and how Russia can launch an offensive operation through its military axes against NATO. Russia develops its defensive and offensive security system along the strategic arc of the Rimland, which lies almost in parallel with another one. That is the arc which runs along the buffer zone stretching from Finland to Armenia through Ukraine.
Military attack and paralysis of the UN collective security

The geopolitical arcs and ‘strategic pincers’ were the preludes of the Russian revisionist strategy which reflects in the ‘lightning military action’ launched by the Russian Army on 24 February 2022, bearing the code name: ‘Special Military Operation’. It was presented as a military response to NATO’s expansionist policy on Ukraine and therefore the entire Western World—namely the US, the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia—faced the Russian operation as an invasion and a violation of the UN Charter and International Law. However, both the UN Security Council and collective security were paralysed by the Russian veto power while President Putin verified in practice what Clausewitz said, (12) that war constitutes the continuation of diplomacy with the usage of other, military means.
Taking into consideration Russia’s ‘modus operandi’ the question that should be answered is the following: What is the existing situation after the Russian military action in Ukraine?

Firstly, Russia pursues to create a new state of affairs based on its revisionist strategy. As a result, no one can allege that such a policy is limited to the Ukrainian borders. On the contrary, it expands to the regions of Eastern and Northern Europe, the Caucasus Region and also reaches the Middle East. As to Europe, the minimum strategic aspiration of Moscow is to achieve the establishment of a joint security zone alongside Belarus and Ukraine.

Secondly, if the Russian invasion of Ukraine aims to create a new state of affairs with an ‘imperial character’, why Moscow did not target the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria instead? Because in that case, the conflict between NATO and Russia would have been a direct one, with a scenario of a Pan-European and/or a Third World War falling into the sphere of real probability. Such a war case scenario can only be prevented either if the US, the United Kingdom and the EU show political compliance to the new state of affairs established by Russia or if the economic and political cost—resulting from the sanctions imposed by the Western World and a new type of military deterrence compel Russia to implement a compromising policy.
Thirdly, even though in the very recent past the French President Emmanuel Macron claimed that ‘we are currently experiencing the brain death of NATO’,(13) nowadays the strategic role of the Alliance is being upgraded and upholds its dominant role in Europe due to the following facts and developments:

1. Most of the EU member-states (except Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, and Sweden) are NATO members.

2. There is no autonomous European Defence and Security System.

3. The Russian threat cannot be prevented without US power.

4. The Russian threat is increasing Europe’s economic and military dependence on the US.

Fourthly, the sanctions that have been imposed by the EU, will not only cause economic and financial costs to Russia but also to the EU member-states whose dependence on the Russian energy supply(14) reaches an average of 40 per cent. There are states like Lithuania and Finland that their dependence is about 93 per cent and 94 per cent respectively while Germany’s comes up to 46 per cent. President Joe Biden has argued that with the sanctions inflicted by his country along with the EU and other Western countries, Russia will be isolated from the global economic and banking system thus becoming a ‘rogue state’.(15) But what do the Americans have in mind when they refer to a ‘rogue state’? The US policy, which is backed by the EU, blocks and excludes Russia from the SWIFT payment system and therefore from the global banking procedures, free market and trade. Several additional sanctions followed and the Kremlin responded by imposing measures on the gas supply.
Economic war and NATO

The sanctions aim to doom Russia into an isolation that ostensibly appears to be similar to Cold War seclusions . However, the energy and other interdependences that have been created ever since do not only cripple the Russian economy but also the economies of the western and other countries that have energy, trade and other banking relations with Moscow. While Russia invaded Ukraine, the Western World declared an economic war against the Kremlin to vitiate Russia as much as possible, particularly in the long term. This is the first step taken by the Western states.

The second one was to increase their defence budgets(16) and the third one was to enhance NATO’s role by supporting the states on the front—line such as Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. These are some of the main strategic responses to the Russian revisionist strategy and the structural changes that might be induced if the war against Ukraine brings to the Kremlin positive geopolitical results. Russia articulated that its military operation was triggered by the US and its Allies’ strategy to integrate Ukraine into NATO’s security system. The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy referred even to a possible deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of his country. This is a policy that is perceived by Russia as a threat to its security.(17) In the context of a tough diplomatic game, Belarus amended and invalidated Article 18, Paragraph 2 of its constitution, which did not allow the installation of nuclear weapons on its territory, and thus communicated a message of equivalent response. Apart from NATO’s threat, the Kremlin decided to take action on the pretext that the Russian-speaking population living in Southeastern Ukraine has been suffering genocide for the past eight years. According to Russian allegations, this genocide is organized and executed by Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups(18) and therefore Moscow felt the obligation to halt it in the name of ‘Missionary Diplomacy’ as the US and its Allies have done many times in the past. Russia articulated that it could not allow any threat to be launched by the Ukrainian territory and thus the country should be demilitarized and never join NATO. As the Minsk Agreement became a dead letter, Russia decided to unilaterally enforce the status of demilitarization on the battlefield showing that a state can dictate the rules of peace on the diplomatic field by the usage of the sword, if necessary. Since Russia enjoys the right of veto in the Security Council no measures were and can be taken against it. Although sanctions were imposed by the Western states, the UN collective security system was neutralized and military power along with national interests prevailed in the international system. With that in view, Russia pursues to form a new security architecture in line with its revisionist strategy and national interests. Therefore, it considers as hostile any expansionist action that might be taken by NATO towards Sweden, Finland and Ukraine.(19) The question is what the Russian reaction might be if NATO integrates both Sweden and Finland? Will it get involved in a new war or will it deploy hypersonic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons at its borders with Finland and in Kaliningrad? Moreover, Moscow demands NATO pull out its troops from Romania, Bulgaria and other Eastern countries which might be seen as threats against Russia. President Biden stated that he would not send troops on the ground. However, the US and NATO expected that the Russian forces face the risk of attrition in the context of war. To this end, NATO and some of the EU member-states are sending ammunitions and weapons to Ukraine(20) and support, in practice, the resistance against the Russian army.
‘Napoleon axe’ and China’s role

Regardless of the situation on the ground, President Putin put Russian deterrence forces on high combat alert and thus used the nuclear threat(21) and the nightmare scenario of the Third World War to prevent any thoughts about a military intervention that might be launched by NATO. The Russian distant goal seems to be the establishment of a new political and security system in which both Belarus and Ukraine are meant to participate. One of the main aims is the creation of a new security system extending up to Poland’s borders keeping the ‘Napoleon axe’, which passes through Belarus, free and safe. To reach this strategic goal, Russia should demilitarize Ukraine and assume control over it in the shadow of its power by forming a strategic ‘pincer’ starting from Transnistria and ending at Belarus after passing through Odessa, Mariupol and the south-eastern region of Ukraine. The other complementary option is to encircle the Baltic States with the formulation of a strategic arrow starting from the mouth of the Neva Bay ending in Kaliningrad. If President Putin does not intend to water down his revisionist strategy, the US and its Allies will not relent or end the economic and any other sanctions that they imposed against Russia. More or less we eyewitness a zero-sum game. The question is whether Kremlin is to turn into a ‘roguestate’ or restore its old empire. The answer to this question is relevant to the RussoSino relations. Scholars and theorists argue that the way the US managed the Ukrainian issue pushed Moscow deeper into Chinese arms.(22) Taking into consideration the existing situation, we underline the following:

1. Agreements have already been signed by both countries, aiming to cover the increasing needs of the Chinese economy.

2. Both Presidents, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping decided on 22 February 2022, to enhance their relations and establish a friendship that has no formal limits.

3. The ‘Green Energy Policy’ (‘European Union Energy Map’) and the decisions taken by the EU to get free from the Russian energy dependence forced the Kremlin to find new markets one of which is China. Beyond China, Russia has begun to channel gas to the Arctic region where another power game is underway. Although Russia’s future energy interests are located in China, NATO’s perceived threat in Europe remains alive and Russia aspires to create a new security architecture in which Belarus and Ukraine form an integral part.

The war in Georgia

The roots of the current war in Ukraine can be traced back to the war in Georgia in 2008 which could be dubbed the Russian veto to NATO’s expansionism. This veto was exercised by the Kremlin on the ground with the use of military strength. The war in Georgia reflects Russia’s first step in implementing its revisionist strategy. In the years just after the end of the Cold War, Russia was not strong enough neither economically nor militarily (23) to put forward a revisionist strategy. The US policy gave rise to Russia’s revisionist strategy, as NATO offered a Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine (24). This offer was a result of the NATO Summit that
took place on 3 April 2008. Russia reacted immediately, and President Putin stated that NATO’s enlargement towards Moscow was a direct threat to his country (25). NATO’s decision was perceived by Russia as a threat that was turned against its own ‘living space’. Under this rationale, Russia resolved to exercise the right of selfdefence to protect its own security, per Article 51 of the UN Charter. The next strategic step taken by Moscow was to mobilize the separatist forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The war in Georgia should be seen through the lens of the Russian ‘living space’ and cyberwar as an instrument of power projection (26).
Iron will and cyberwar

The political iron will that the Kremlin demonstrated in the crisis, and the military intervention proved that the Russian strategic aim was to hold Georgia within its ‘living space’ and deter NATO’s expansionist strategy towards the Russian backyard. The Black Sea and the Caucasus region constitute integral parts of the Russian geopolitical landscape. Although the war in Georgia disclosed that Russian military forces needed to be reformed and modernized, in the field of cyberwar, Moscow was effective by combining conventional military means and strategic tactics with Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS). Russian hackers attacked the strategic

Public Services and the banking sector by flooding the Georgian devices with demands, data and other information. Therefore, they paralysed both the civil and military systems and doomed Georgia to isolation from the rest of the world Accordingly, they manipulated the ‘information war’ and shut down telecommunications and other electronic and computing systems (27). Thus, Russia facilitated its military operations conducted by conventional military means such as artillery units, tanks and flights of fighting air jets. Furthermore, the industry sector and other strategic and critical infrastructures of Georgia recorded heavy damages. This is the reason that the results of the said cyber-attacks have been labelled as ‘isolation and silence’. Another severe consequence of the Russian cyber attack was that Moscow achieved a victory in the field of the psychological war, which affects the morale of military forces and civilian resistance.

The war in Georgia was a historic event which paved the path for the Russian revisionist strategy (28). Moscow prevented NATO’s expansionism and seized the opportunity to recognize the independence of both the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
another political and legal decision that highlights the Russian revisionist strategy and its efforts to redistribute power and bring on structural changes in this particular region, favouring Moscow’s geopolitical and security interests. Russia kept NATO away from its borders and preserves a buffer zone which includes Finland, Sweden, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. This Russian defensive arc from Finland to Armenia does not encompass the Baltic States which are NATO members. However, Moscow created a strategic ‘pincer movement’ around them for security reasons trapping the Baltic states and neutralizing any NATO threat which might arise.

Russia in the Caucasus region

The War in Georgia was the first step. The Crimean and Armenian cases followed. Russia has recovered from the devastating consequences of the Cold War and flexes its military muscles. Therefore, it claims a reliable leading position in the international arena while considering Ukraine, the Caucasus region and beyond, up to the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea as parts of its ‘living space’ (29).
An akin phenomenon to that which occurred in Ukraine appeared in the Caucasus region. The Armenians considered that the Russians were about to save them from an external attack as the Ukrainians believed about the Americans and the Western

World respectively. Due to the close economic and military relations that the Armenians maintained with Moscow, they assumed that a Russian preventive safety net existed around their country, particularly in Nagorno Karabakh. On 27 September 2020, when Azerbaijan launched a massive attack to recapture what it had lost during the war between 1991 and 1994 in Nagorno Karabakh, the preventive safety net did not work. Even if it existed, it was not meant to prevent the attack itself but to rescue the Armenians from absolute destruction. This interpretation was provided by the Armenian Prime Minister and the Chief of General
Staff (30). On 8 November 2020, the Azeris marched about 5 km outside Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno Karabakh and the Armenians could not prevent them from moving forward for the following reasons:

1. The Azeris had Turkish military support and Russian tolerance.

2. The Azeris capitalized on the advantage offered by Turkish drones, which proved to be a pivotal weapon for their victory, as the conflict was labelled the ‘War of Drones’ (31).

3. The general staff of Armenia and the politicians either did not predict or did not understand how crucial the Turkish involvement was in the crisis. They did not conceive that the balance of power could be upset since they did not have any external military support.

4. The Armenian politicians underestimated the close relations between Russia and Turkey, which are based on strategic and geopolitical interests.

On 9 November 2020, a cease-fire agreement was signed and entered into force on 10 November. The whole deal was painful for the Armenians (32). They lost all the Azerian territories captured in 1994 and about 40 per cent of Nagorno Karabakh (33). The Kremlin intervened to save the Armenians, and in return, 2000 well-armed Russian troops replaced the dominant role that the Armenian forces played in Nagorno Karabakh (34) Simultaneously:

1. The dependence of Armenia on Russian protection has been increased as, among others, the ‘Lachin corridor’, which links Yerevan with Stepanakert, is under the control of Russian troops.

2. Moscow consolidated its leading role in the region while allowing Turkey to help its fraternal state of Azerbaijan to reoccupy territories lost in 1994. Those who have military control over an area can exercise political and geostrategic suzerainty. The status quo, which resulted from the war in Nagorno Karabakh, favours Turkey, but mostly promotes the Russian revisionist strategy.

The Middle East
Syria

Russian ‘living space’ is not limited to the Caucasus region, but reaches the Middle East. The Russian revisionist strategy extends to Syria and is fuelled by the mistaken strategic options of the US. The Americans triggered a war, but they did not see the end of it. They pulled their troops out and did not allow the situation to turn into a new Vietnam. At the same time, they ordered their remaining forces to move towards the border with Iraq close to the oil fields, which are of utmost strategic importance to them (35). Syria was traditionally under Russian influence (36). The efforts of the US to topple the Assad regime from within and with the use of military power on the pretext of ‘missionary diplomacy’, forced Russia to get involved in the crisis to defend and promote its own geopolitical and geostrategic interests (37). The Russian Naval Base in Tartus and the Air Base in Latakia are the only ones that Moscow has in the region, while they lie over Suez’s strategic chokepoint (38).
Muslim crescent of power
Russia engaged in Syria for the following reasons:

1. Energy issues. Russia tolerates, to say the least, the construction of the pipeline from Iran to Syria through Iraq. This pipeline is a competitor to the Nabucco pipelineand constitutes an alternative option to the Qatar-Turkey pipeline (39). Moreover, Moscow expects to reserve the energy plots lying in the quasi EEZ of Syria. Thus, vital interests are at stake, and Russia demonstrates that it is able to defend them.

2. Military and geostrategic issues. A) In enforcing its revisionist policy, Russia aims to form another geostrategic arc which starts from its territory and ends up at the Syrian coasts after passing through the Caspian Sea, Iran and Iraq. Within the inner side of such an arc, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are included. B) Russia has already deployed an antimissile network consisting of S-400 and S-300 (40). This network constitutes a defending shield favouring Moscow as it covers a number of states such as India, Iran, Armenia, Turkey and others. Furthermore, Moscow pursues to increase its influence on the ‘Shia crescent of power’, which begins from Syria and Lebanon and by crossing Iran and Iraq, reaches south into Yemen. Syria lies at the western edge of this crescent. As a result, it constitutes an indispensable factor for Russia to whittle down the US sphere of influence in this specific region and the leading role that Sunni Saudi Arabia wishes to hold in Arab countries.
Conclusion

The better we understand why Russia intends to increase its geopolitical and geostrategic position and role in the regional arena, the better we can realize why and how the Russian revisionist policy has been developing since 2008, from Europe to the Middle East, via the Caucasus region. Since 2008: a) Russia prevented NATO’s expansionist policy through the wars in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine. Russia returned stridently to the international arena; b) Russia has consolidated its position as a leading and dominant power in the Caucasus region; c) It took action in the Middle East and defended its strategic interests in Syria. Moscow uses all the necessary factors available to realize its revisionist strategy. Such factors are:

1. Military strength. The first level is that of a preventive strategy. The second is that of the Russian aim to consolidate its strategy either with force—as occurred in the cases of Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine—or in the shadow of its power.

2. Gas and oil. Russia uses the pipelines like ‘energy divisions’ to serve its interests and increase its political influence over states and governments.

3. Technology. Russia combined conventional and cyber techniques and tactics in the wars that it led from 2008. Its conventional military forces include sophisticated weapons such as the missile systems of S-300 and S-400 and the hypersonic missiles (3M22 Zircon) that combined with its extended cyberwar capabilities provide Russia with the chance to attenuate the advantage that the US holds in the sea due to its tremendous war fleet power (41).

4. Historical and imperial Russian consciousness (42). Moscow has an imperial identity and consciousness, military power, national resources and a pivotal geopolitical position in the core of the Heartland. By combining these factors, Moscow fuels its political machine to accomplish its strategic missions and targets.

5. Russian minorities existing in other states are used by the Kremlin as strategic instruments to achieve its national goals. This phenomenon is evident in the cases of Crimea and Ukraine.

Minorities also exist in the Baltic States and other countries, which emerged in the regional system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this specific issue of minorities takes wider and more complicated dimensions. It is also relevant to political and legal motives and the right to self-determination, the exercise of which depends on conflicting and convergent national interests of the parties involved as well as the uniqueness of each case. Moreover, humanity experienced tragic implications when Adolf Hitler exploited the Sudeten Germans as a strategic instrument to occupy Czechoslovakia paving the way for the Second World War. It is not a new strategic practice. Therefore, history repeats itself because the feeling of national integration cannot be easily suppressed.

The lack of an adequate European and American preventive strategy is a quasi-ally of Russia which pursues to restructure the international system and promote its revisionist strategy. The American and European expansionist policy offered Russia the pretext to put forward a preventive and then a revisionist policy in Georgia, Crimea, Syria and Ukraine. Moscow seized the opportunity to make its case by accusing the US and NATO of following an aggressive strategy that put Russian security at stake. While Russia argues that it is in defence, at the same time, it promotes its revisionist, even belligerent strategy, which partially induces a redistribution of power and the restructuring of the regional and international system in line with its hegemonic strategic goals (43). Whether this policy will be successful and to what extent, is something that only time can show. The War on Ukraine seems to be a cornerstone for the future structural changes in Europe and worldwide. Russia pursues to raise itself as a game-changer. The relevant question is the following: What structural changes the Russo-Ukrainian War could bring about?

1. A New European security architecture with a twofold dimension. One concerning Europe and the US and the other Russia. NATO remains the most reliable system of collective security in Europe and elsewhere. Germany announced a new defence budget of up to 100 billion euros, hence laying the groundwork to become the biggest military power in the Old Continent. The question is whether the Europeans will step down from ‘NATO’s chariot’, choosing to establish an autonomous security system, or will continue to cohabit with the Americans in the shadow of the US supremacy. With the invasion of Ukraine and the cost that it will pay as a result of the sanctions imposed by the Western World, Russia bound itself to restructure the European Security System by including Ukraine and Belarus within its zone of influence. This strategy, at the very least, points to the creation of a buffer zone between Russia and the rest of Europe.

2. A restructured multipolar system. Thus, new economic, military, commercial, financial and energy relations are to be established between: a) Russia and China and b) Russia and the rest of Europe. So far, the Old Continent consists of two poles plus Russia. The first one is the EU and its memberstates and the second is that of the United Kingdom which is a NATO member and plays an autonomous role in Europe as the closest US ally. c) Russia and the US. d) The US and Europe either within or out of NATO. e) The EU and Russia. f) The US and EU on the one hand and China on the other.

If the Western World continues the sanctions and dooms Russia to isolation, it is like pushing it deeper into Chinese arms. This view can also be put in this way: The revisionist strategy might lead Russia to isolation. The question is whether China is to put forward a pendulum policy. If China follows a pendulum policy, some of the
future alliances might be formulated on the basis of the convergent national interests of the Great Powers as per circumstances. In this regard, the weakening of both Russia and Europe and the US would be in favour of Beijing’s strategy to consolidate its own hegemonic role in a multipolar system. In parallel, the upcoming geopolitical and strategic structural changes raise the question of whether it is going to be a European Europe or a German Europe or an American Europe or a mixed situation in the context of NATO that is to strive against the new Russian threat. Russian revisionist strategy takes into consideration but does not depend on the strategic options that the other Great Powers implement, particularly the US. If so far America is the hegemon of Europe, particularly through NATO, Russia is at least a revisionist power on the rise, acting in the landmass of Eurasia by following its destiny to play again a primary leading role in the regional and global system. Russia is taking the risk of whether it will end up as a ‘rogue-state’ or rise as a mighty empire with the nightmare of an expanded war terrorizing the regional and global system.

Notes
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Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the participation of Mr. Demetrios C. Melides, Lecturer, Ledra College and Brigadier Dinos Stylianou, National Guard of Cyprus in both textual and technical editing as well as to thank them for their contribution to the manuscript’s critical revision.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)
Dr. Yiannos Charalambides is Assistant Professor and Head of the Masters and Bachelors Degree programme in International Relations, Global Economy and Strategic Studies at Ledra College (Cyprus) and VUZF University, Bulgaria. Views expressed are personal. Strategic Analysis, 2022
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2076303
To cite this article: Yiannos Charalambides (2022): A Russian Revisionist Strategy on the Rise?, Strategic Analysis, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2022.2076303 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2076303
Published online: 26 Jun 2022.