Εντύπωση προκαλεί η «βελούδινη» αντιμετώπιση του Think Tank σε αυτό
το ενδεχόμενο, αποφεύγοντας την εμπρηστική ρητορική του παρελθόντος, ενώ
διαβεβαιώνει ότι «ήδη δημιουργήθηκε η βάση των Ρωσικών δυνάμεων εντός
πολεμικού αεροδρομίου».

Εκατοντάδες…Ρώσοι στρατιώτες και αξιωματικοί
κάνουν την προεργασία για την άφιξη χιλιάδων στρατιωτών που θα πέσουν
στην μάχη κατά της ισλαμικής τρομοκρατίας. Παράλληλα, δεκάδες Ρώσικα
πολεμικά αεροσκάφη και επιθετικά ελικόπτερα θα επιχειρούν ώστε να
υποστηρίξουν τις χερσαίες δυνάμεις.

Το Stratfor   είναι βέβαιο ότι η υποστήριξη της
Ρωσίας προς την Δαμασκό θα περιλαμβάνει και βαριά οπλικά συστήματα που
θα παραδοθούν στον Συριακό στρατό, αλλά ήδη υπάρχουν και βίντεο από τα
πεδία μάχης με ρωσόφωνους στρατιώτες να επιχειρούν μαζί με στρατό και
πολιτοφυλακές.
Υπάρχουν όμως και ιδιωτικές ρωσικές εταιρείες που έχουν προμηθεύσει
μισθοφόρους με την σύμφωνη γνώμη της Μόσχας, αφού απ’ ευθείας
στρατιωτική εμπλοκή στο πλευρό του Συριακού στρατού δεν βολεύει το
Κρεμλίνο την παρούσα στιγμή όσο διαρκούν οι πολιτικές διαπραγματεύσεις.
Αντίθετα, η Ρωσική βάση πλησίον της Δαμασκού θα μπορέσει να εμπλακεί
επισήμως στις μάχες με το πρόσχημα της προστασίας της βάσης από
επιθέσεις.

Το Στράτφορ επίσης τονίζει ότι κλιμάκια των μυστικών υπηρεσιών ήδη
παρέχουν πληροφορίες στον Συριακό στρατό για τις θέσεις ισλαμιστών
προκειμένου οι επιθέσεις να είναι «χειρουργικές», χωρίς θύματα στον
άμαχο πληθυσμό που οι τζιχαντιστές χρησιμοποιούν ως ανθρώπινες ασπίδες.

tribune
 

Δείτε ολόκληρο το άρθρο του Stratfor: 

Russia could be in the process of greatly expanding its
involvement in the Syrian conflict, according to sources from Israeli
news source Ynet. An Aug. 31 report suggests that a Russian
expeditionary force has already arrived in Syria, setting up camp in a
loyalist air base near Damascus. If the reporting is accurate, it could
be an early indication that Russia will throw its heft behind the Syrian
air campaign against the Islamic State and the rebel-aligned factions
in the country. According to Ynet, thousands of Russian military
personnel are expected to arrive in Syria in the coming weeks, including
military advisers and instructors as well as logistics and technical
personnel. Additionally, members of the aerial protection division are
expected, alongside pilots who will fly an unknown number of fighter
aircraft and attack helicopters.

It is Stratfor’s assessment that Russia is steadily
increasing its support for Damascus. This assistance ranges from the
provision of extra materiel, weaponry and equipment to the greater
sharing of intelligence on rebel positions and dispositions. Russian
pilots and aircraft mechanics also have a long history of serving in
foreign air forces in conflict zones, either at the behest of the
government or as private contractors. Evidence that Russia is taking a
more combative role is already emerging. Stratfor identified
Russian-language speakers in recent combat footage obtained from Syria,
further corroborating the likelihood that either Russian military
personnel or Russian-speaking private military contractors are now
actively involved in the conflict.

Nevertheless, Stratfor has yet to see concrete evidence of expanded
Russian participation in the Syrian conflict on the scale suggested by
Ynet. In fact, cases of false reporting are common, especially where
direct Russian support is concerned. Previous reports of MiG-31
interceptor transfers to Syria were never proved, leading to subsequent
Russian denials.

When it comes to providing decisive support to Syria, Russia is
torn. Moscow is trying to position itself as a credible power that can
negotiate a political solution to the Syrian conflict, yet the Kremlin
is also keen to bolster the forces of Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
If it hopes to reach a favorable settlement, Russia must ensure that
loyalist forces do not suffer devastating losses: A weak Damascus would
make it harder for Russia to reach an understanding with the rebels and
their backers that would safeguard its overall interests in Syria and
the region. Thus, it makes sense for Moscow to bolster Syria’s defenses,
but a full military commitment is unlikely. Such an intervention in the
conflict would undermine Russia’s position as a strong mediator,
calling into question Moscow’s overall objectivity. Regardless, given
the inherent volatility of the Syrian conflict, Stratfor will closely
watch for any further signs of increased Russian involvement in the
conflict.

Elsewhere in Syria, Islamic State fighters battling Syrian rebels
moved closer than ever to central Damascus. Street battles reportedly
raged in the Asali neighborhood of the capital’s southern Qadam district
over the weekend, killing at least 15 fighters as Islamic State
militants seized at least two streets. The district had been relatively
quiet since rebels and government forces reached a localized truce a
year ago. Stratfor sources indicate that Moscow may finally have been
able to get Damascus and the mainstream rebel opposition to broadly
agree on elements of a political transition of power in Syria.

Aug. 29

Syria

Russia long supplied Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s forces with
the vast majority of their weaponry. Though Iran has since replaced
Russia as the primary weapons-provider to the Syrian government, the
Russians have continued to ship substantial volumes of small arms,
ammunition, spare parts and refurbished material to pro-Damascus forces
over the course of the Syrian civil war. This aid, along with support
from Iran and other allies, has been vital in maintaining the loyalist
armies. And over the last week, there have been indications that the
Russians are increasing their support for the al Assad government.

On Aug. 20, the Alligator-class landing ship Nikolay
Filchenkov from the Russian Black Sea Fleet was spotted in the Bosporus
(σας το αποκαλύψαμε εδώ).
On the deck of the amphibious warship, and within the cargo hold as
well, were numerous army vehicles and armored personnel carriers, almost
certainly headed for the Syrian coast. The same week, videos emerged of
BTR-82A armored personnel carriers in action alongside the Syrian
Republican Guard and National Defense Forces in the Latakia Mountains.
Bearing markings unusual for Syrian equipment, the vehicles are likely
recent deliveries from Russia. Recent photos show more Russian equipment
recently arrived in Syria, including GAZ Tigr all-terrain mobility
vehicles and UR-77 mine-clearing vehicles. Furthermore, on top of a
recent rise in Russian military cargo flights into the two Syrian
coastal provinces of Tartus and Latakia, reports from sources close to
the Syrian government indicate Russia is enhancing its
intelligence-sharing program with the Syrians, including the provision
of satellite pictures of the battlefield.

The increase in Russian aid is a clear reminder that the Russians
are not abandoning the Syrian government. Rather, even as Moscow
attempts to mediate a negotiated solution to the Syrian crisis that will
safeguard its interests in the region, it will continue to exert
considerable effort to make sure the Syrian government can hold its own
on the battlefield. It is unlikely that this aid alone will reverse the
outcome of the conflict to favor al Assad’s forces, because, although
generous, it neither fulfills all the Syrian loyalists’ weapons
requirements nor solves their manpower problems. Still, additional
equipment from Russia will bolster the forces as they seek to prevent
further rebel gains into their core territories.

However, the origins of the funds being used for these weapons are a
mystery. Russia may be providing the increased support without direct
financial compensation or the Iranians may have financed the latest
Russian shipments. Iran is widely suspected to be behind past aid to
Syrian loyalists. It is clear, though, that the money is not coming from
Syria itself. Al Assad’s government is in dire economic straits and is
likely unable to purchase more weapons on its own.

Aug. 19

Syria

Stratfor receives insight from many sources around the world, along
with reports not available for public consumption. It is important to
caveat that many reports are unconfirmed or speculative in nature,
though they provide valuable context. Interpreting information and
compiling multiple data points to build a picture is part of
intelligence analysis. Any and all reporting is carefully filtered
before being disseminated by Stratfor, yet some insight is worth sharing
on its own merits, such as this account from Syria, below.

Russia is heavily invested in the Syrian conflict and has a
significant stake in shaping any enduring peace. Stratfor sources
indicate that Moscow may have finally been able to get Damascus and the
mainstream rebel opposition to broadly agree on elements of a political
transition of power in Syria. Russia has long insisted that present
Syrian President Bashar al Assad must remain in power during any
transition. This is a sticking point for many of the rebel groups, but
Moscow appears to have been able to negotiate a middle ground. As
Stratfor previously noted Aug. 7:

A flurry of meetings is taking place as stakeholders in the Syrian
conflict attempt to work out a power-sharing agreement to replace the
government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Russia has been driving
the negotiation, while Oman acts as a neutral mediator relaying messages
to and from Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia and the United
States. Though the diplomatic activity is picking up, it is still an
outside effort divorced from the reality of the battlefield, where
Syrian rebels are fighting the al Assad government on their own terms.

According to reports received by Stratfor, al Assad will remain in
power during a transition, then cede his political responsibilities to
Farouk al-Shara, who will assume the role of Syria’s prime minister
during the changeover period. In exchange for remaining as a politically
neutered figurehead, al Assad will have to let go Syrian National
Security Bureau chief Gen. Ali Mamlouk. The opposition will then choose a
replacement for Mamlouk — a person that is acceptable to al Assad. The
role of army chief of staff would be awarded to an unspecified Alawite
and, in addition, the minister of defense portfolio would go to a former
brigade commander from the Syrian Republican Guard, Manaf Tlass, who
defected to the West in 2012. Stratfor had earlier received word from
sources that Tlass, a Sunni, whose family has a long-standing alliance
with the al Assad clan, was preparing to re-enter the political scene
after spending much of the civil war in Paris.

After a highly publicized defection in 2012, Tlass has been in
Paris, keeping a low profile and waiting for the right time to insert
himself into negotiations. The Tlass family has a long history with the
al Assad family: Manaf’s father, Mustafa Tlass, helped rally strong
military and Sunni support for al Assad when he took power in 2000. In
2012, we noted that the two families were likely to strike a deal to
enable the Tlass family to leave Syria, and we forecast that Manaf Tlass
would eventually return to play a role in a power-sharing arrangement.
Given that Tlass is a Sunni with a military background who has also
maintained close links with the al Assad administration, it is little
wonder that he is now allegedly being proffered as a suitable candidate
for defense minister in a new Syrian government.

Though Stratfor is unable to confirm the specificity of this
insight, there is nothing that is particularly implausible. Farouk
al-Shara is one of the more acceptable candidates for the opposition: He
is Sunni Muslim, a known nationalist, and publically sought a
negotiated solution to the crisis rather than a military one. He also
has strong family ties to the rebel-dominated Daraa province. On the
other hand, he is staunchly loyal to the al Assad government and is
deeply embedded in the Baath Party. Tlass meets the criteria of being a
Sunni, but it will be difficult for him to win the trust of the broader
Sunni rebellion, which perceives him as being too close to the al
Assads. He will also be regarded as out of touch with reality on the
ground after spending years in Europe instead of joining the fight.

As Stratfor previously noted, any agreement between Moscow and the
Syrian National Coalition is largely irrelevant if it does not have
tacit support from fractious rebel groups. The Syrian National Coalition
does not speak for the majority of rebel factions, many of which are
achieving limited tactical success against Damascus and the Islamic
State. This may influence the rebel’s willingness to accommodate a
political transition, or not. Stratfor closely monitors the behavior of
all components of the Syrian conflict and is alert for any change in the
political dynamic that could lead to a negotiated solution to the
crisis.

Aug. 17

Syria

A previously arranged cease-fire between Syrian rebels and loyalist
forces, including Hezbollah elements, collapsed over the weekend.
Originally scheduled to end Aug. 16, the cease-fire was in part mediated
by Iran and Turkey four days earlier. Centering on the towns of
Zabadani, Fuaa and Kafriyeh, the temporary cessation of hostilities
showed promise when it was extended beyond the agreed-upon 48-hour
duration. Ongoing negotiations seek an end to the conflict in Syria, and
localized cease-fires provide important foundations on which to build.
However, the collapse of the cease-fire amid entrenched disagreements
and mistrust only serves to emphasize the deep divides that exist in
Syria. Such divisions will make any comprehensive negotiated solution to
the crisis extremely difficult to achieve.

Farther north, the Islamic State showed its determination to hold
onto territory in Aleppo province, despite the overarching threat from
U.S. and Turkish airstrikes. By continuing its attacks against rebel
groups in the area, the Islamic States hopes to undermine a key
component of the Turkish-American plan: to train and support certain
rebel factions that can then be employed as proxy forces on the ground
in Syria. The Islamic State made gains around the key town of Mare,
undoubtedly assisted by the withdrawal of Jabhat al-Nusra forces from
front-line positions against the Islamic State in Aleppo province.

Damascus recently launched its own offensive in Aleppo province,
directed toward Kweiris Air Base, currently besieged by the Islamic
State. The latest indications from the ground are that the offensive has
already been halted, with little headway made against the extremist
group. The loyalist forces simply could not muster enough combat power
for a successful push against Kweiris, highlighting the precarious
position the air base defenders find themselves in after years of being
under siege.

Syria

Forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al Assad have launched an
offensive in rural Aleppo province aimed at reaching the government-held
Kweiris air base, which is currently under siege by the Islamic State.
With the disastrous August 2014 loss of Tabqa air base fresh in their
minds, the Syrian government is keenly aware that an Islamic State
massacre of the Kweiris defenders could trigger another wave of popular
discontent among the loyalist population. Indeed, over the last few
days, there have been a few demonstrations in the government stronghold
of Tartus calling on Damascus to break the siege and to get its soldiers
out of Kweiris air base.

The air base is around 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the nearest
loyalist lines. The government push to break the siege is a risky
endeavor because it is being launched with hastily gathered forces at a
time when the loyalists are under significant pressure across the
country. The forces will have to contend with potential Islamic State
attacks on both flanks and the possibility that the relief force might
itself become cut off from assistance. For the defenders of the Kweiris
air base, however, the relief force may be their last chance: They have
been under siege now for years and are suffering from steady attrition.