At first glance, it appears that the United States and Turkey are
working hand in hand to end the Syrian civil war. On August 11, after
meeting with Turkish officials, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
released a statement that the two countries’ foreign ministries were
coordinating to support the Syrian opposition and bring about a
democratic transition. In Ankara on August 23, U.S. and Turkish
officials turned those words into action, holding their first
operational planning meeting aimed at hastening the downfall of the
regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Beneath their common desire to oust Assad, however, Washington and
Ankara have two distinctly different visions of a post-revolutionary
Syria. The United States insists that any solution to the Syrian crisis
should guarantee religious and ethnic pluralism. But Turkey, which is
ruled by a Sunni government, has come to see the conflict in sectarian
terms, building close ties with Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood–dominated
Sunni opposition, seeking to suppress the rights of Syrian Kurds, and
castigating the minority Alawites — Assad’s sect — as enemies. That
should be unsettling for the Obama administration, since it means that
Turkey will not be of help in promoting a multi-ethnic, democratic
government in Damascus. In fact, Turkish attitudes have already
contributed to Syria’s worsening sectarian divisions.

Washington is pushing for pluralism. In Istanbul last month, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip
Gordon emphasized that “the Syrian opposition needs to be inclusive,
needs to give a voice to all of the groups in Syria . . . and that
includes Kurds.” Clinton, after meeting with her Turkish counterpart,
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, stressed that a new Syrian government
“will need to protect the rights of all Syrians regardless of religion,
gender, or ethnicity.”   

It is unclear, however, whether Ankara is on board. As it lends
critical support to the Sunni rebellion, Turkey has not made an attempt
to reach out to the other ethnic and sectarian communities in the
country. Instead, Turkey has framed the Syrian conflict in alienating
religious terms. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), a
Sunni conservative bloc, singles out Syria’s Alawites as villains,
regularly denouncing their “minority regime.” Hüseyin Çelik, an AKP
spokesperson, claimed at a press conference on September 8, 2011, that
“the Baath regime relies on a mass of 15 percent” — the percentage of
Alawites in the country. Such a narrative overlooks the fact that the
Baath regime has long owed its survival to the support of a significant
portion of the majority Sunnis.

The AKP has antagonized not only Syria’s Alawites but also its Kurds.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has insisted that his
country would resist any Kurdish push for autonomy in parts of
northeastern Syria, going so far as to threaten military intervention.
The Turkish government’s unreserved support for the Sunni opposition is
due not only to an ideological affinity with it but also to the fact
that the Sunni rebels oppose the aspirations of the Syrian Kurds.

Meanwhile, the AKP has sought to sell its anti-Assad policy to the
Turkish public by fanning the flames of sectarianism at home. The AKP
has directed increasingly aggressive rhetoric toward Turkey’s largest
religious minority, the Alevis, and accused them of supporting the
Alawites out of religious solidarity. The Alevis, a Turkish- and
Kurdish-speaking heterodox Muslim minority that comprises approximately
one-fifth of Turkey’s population, constitute a separate group from the
Arab Alawites. But both creeds share the fate of being treated as
heretics by the Sunnis.

At the September 2011 press conference, Çelik insinuated that Kemal
Kiliçdaroğlu, an Alevi Kurd who leads Turkey’s social democratic
Republican People’s Party (CHP), based his opposition to Turkey’s
entanglement in the Syrian civil war on sectarian motives. “Why are you
defending the Baath regime?” he inquired. “Bad things come to my mind.
Is it perhaps because of sectarian solidarity?” In a similar vein,
Erdogan claimed in March that Kiliçdaroğlu’s motives for supposedly
befriending the Syrian president were religious, stating, “Don’t forget
that a person’s religion is the religion of his friend.”

• ΗΠΑ δεν αντιτίθεται στις Φιλοδοξίες των Κούρδων της Συρίας

“Η Αμέριστη
υποστήριξη της τουρκικής κυβέρνησης στην συριακή σουνιτική αντιπολίτευση  δεν
οφείλεται μόνο στην ιδεολογική συγγένεια τους αλλά και στο
γεγονός ότι οι αντάρτες σουνίτες αντιτίθενται στις προσδοκίες των
Κούρδων της Συρίας,
Η κυβέρνηση των ΗΠΑ φέρεται να έχει ασκήσει πίεση στην Άγκυρα για να αλλάξει τη θέση της για τους Κούρδους της Συρίας – παρά τις τουρκικές ανησυχίες σχετικά με το κουρδικό ζήτημα στην Τουρκία – διότι αποσκοπούν στην δημιουργία  μιας  αμοιβαίας και επωφελής και για τις δυο πλευρές σχέσης μεταξύ τους, παρόμοια με την αυτη της Τουρκίας  με την Πειφερειακή Διοίκηση του Κουρδιστάν  (KRG) στο βόρειο Ιράκ..