The entrance to a tunnel exposed by the Israeli military is seen on the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, March 27, 2014. The IDF announced that the tunnel had been exposed on March 21, 2014.  (photo by REUTERS/Amir Cohen)

On the eve of its incursion into the Gaza Strip, Israel agreed to an Egyptian outline for a cease-fire to restore calm. It was only after 13 militants from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades penetrated Israel in an attempt to launch a terrorist attack
in Kerem Shalom that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) got the green
light to begin a ground assault. And it was only then that soldiers
discovered there was an underground Gaza just like there was an
aboveground Gaza, and that the Hamas movement had invested an enormous
amount of resources into constructing that underground Gaza.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was very wary of defining his
precise objectives to end Operation Protective Edge. Instead, both he
and his government
are making do with more general goals, such as “removing the rocket
threat” and ”restoring quiet to the citizens of Israel.” It was only
following the failed infiltration operation and during the UN-sponsored five-hour humanitarian cease-fire
that it became clear how pressing and urgent the tunnel threat really
was, and that it could pose an even greater threat to Israel than
Hamas’ rockets.

No Iron Dome air defense system has been found as of yet to counter
these terrorist tunnels. Furthermore, in the race against time, there
can be no doubt that Hamas managed to get a step ahead of Israeli
preparedness. In a background briefing for journalists, an IDF source
stated on July 19 that it is questionable whether the army will be able
to locate all of the tunnels. This only testifies to the degree that the
IDF was surprised by the scope and size of the assault tunnels that
Hamas created along the border with Israel.

It was suddenly revealed that there are two Gazas: One is the
crowded, impoverished and faltering Gaza, but there is also an
“underground Gaza,” buried deep below the surface. As of now, the IDF has located
36 tunnels, but even during the current fighting, with the IDF still
searching the area, terrorists have been sent to launch attacks deep in
Israeli territory through tunnels that have yet to be discovered.
According to the security source’s assessment, these are enormous
tunnels, the planning and preparation of which probably lasted
approximately three years. The cost of excavating, reinforcing and
maintaining each tunnel is approximately $1 million, and as far as is
now known, dozens of such quality tunnels were dug along the border
between Israel and the Gaza Strip, from the northernmost part of the
territory all the way to the south.

The Israeli exit of these tunnels is sometimes as far as half a
kilometer beyond the Green Line. Over the years, once the tunnels were
completed, they all required routine maintenance to ensure that they
remained operational and hidden. It was even necessary to protect them
from flooding during winter storms, a problem exacerbated by Gaza’s
broken and collapsing drainage and runoff system. One can only wonder
why Hamas — a movement that advocated the improvement of life quality
for Gaza residents and offered them “change and reform”
— did not even invest as little as one-hundredth of the cost of the
tunnels to renovate Gaza’s sewage system. Instead, it invested in
building more tunnels and rockets.

The Hamas movement has developed three distinct types of tunnels:

The first consists of the many hundreds of tunnels
along the border between Gaza and Egypt, most of which were sealed
recently by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s new regime. These are “economic
tunnels.” They are designed to bring merchandise and raw materials into
Gaza from Egypt. Over the years, and especially after Israel’s
withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor (the route running along Gaza’s
border with Egypt), these tunnels served as an “underground railroad”
of sorts to bring in weapons, including the vast stockpile of rockets
that have accumulated in Gaza.

The second network of tunnels is complex and has multiple branches
running off it. This network, which was burrowed beneath the cities and
refugee camps of Gaza — Khan Yunis, Rafah, Jabaliya, and Shatti — was
designed to hide the stockpile of rockets and launchers. At the same
time, other tunnels were dug to provide protection to Hamas leaders and
allow them mobility. Every single leader of Hamas, from its lowest
ranking bureaucrats to its most senior leaders, is intimately familiar
with the route to the security tunnel assigned to him and his family.
The most senior leadership has its own specific tunnel, which serves as a
“war room” in times of emergency, such as the current military campaign
in the Gaza Strip.

Then there are the tunnels along the border with Israel. These were
intended to allow Hamas activists from the Gaza Strip to infiltrate deep
into Israeli territory. Israel had already established a security fence
along its border with Gaza, which has successfully prevented countless
terrorist infiltrations and attacks. So the border tunnels were dug
beneath the fence.

Much to the misfortune of the people of Gaza, Hamas has invested far
more resources in “underground Gaza” than in “upper Gaza.” The border
tunnels and the defensive tunnels intended to ensure the safety of the
Hamas command cadre proved that the movement’s priorities were flawed.
The movement was founded as a welfare organization, intended to provide
for the needy of Gaza, but instead it invested its resources in its own
needs, at the expense of the population. Anyone who voted for Hamas in
the 2006 elections as a way of protesting Fatah’s corruption received a
very different kind of corruption instead. The “change and reform” that
Hamas offered its voters was invested in its tunnels at the expense of
the people of Gaza.

But the tunnels extending into Israeli territory reveal another
old-new aspect of Hamas’ behavior and methodology. The motif of shahada,
or “martyrdom,” in the person of suicide bombers, has once again taken
over the movement. During the second intifada, Hamas used all its force
and means to encourage suicide attacks against Israel. To do this, it
issued fatwas (religious rulings) that made recruiting of suicide
bombers and sending them on missions to kill Israeli civilians the
fulfillment of God’s will. “Martyrdom” became a central motif in Hamas.
It was so successful, in fact, that the movement’s leaders boasted that
the demand for martyrdom exceeded available opportunities. Hamas was
able to recruit “martyrs” to conduct suicide attacks in Israel at any
given moment. It even produced a fatwa allowing it to recruit women to
die as martyrs.

The entire Hamas system worked to promote and advance the theme of
martyrdom. It emerged as its greatest weapon and, unfortunately, the
most effective and destructive weapon that the movement had, too.
Preachers in mosques used their sermons to speak about the importance of
martyrdom (fi sabil Allah, “in accordance with Allah’s will”), until
many people throughout the West Bank and Gaza sincerely believed that
Allah wanted to be sanctified through the sacrifice of believers’ lives,
and that only through martyrdom could they prove their loyalty and
their faith. At the same time, the movement’s welfare system promised
material enticements to the martyrs’ families, providing them with money
and aid. Both were especially valuable during the intifada, because the
economy had collapsed. Encouraged by Hamas, the motif of suicide was
transformed into a heroic act of sacrifice for the sake of the entire
Palestinian people and its liberation.

It was only after Israel assassinated the movement’s senior political
leadership, starting with its founder Ahmed Yassin in March 2004 and
followed by Abdel Aziz Rantisi the following month, that there was a
dramatic change in Hamas. The encouragement of shahada all but
disappeared from the Hamas lexicon, and the rocket was sanctified instead. Ten years later, Hamas has returned to its ill roots.

The tunnels along the border with Israel are more than just an
extensive engineering project that consumed considerable resources. It
is a project that requires the training of hundreds of armed Izz ad-Din
al-Qassam Brigades’ militants to engage in face-to-face combat in
Israeli territory, though the chances of returning alive from it are
slim. According to the teachings of Hamas, Ash-shahada fi sabil Allah,
“Death upon the order of Allah to sanctify His name,” has become the
combat doctrine used to train the movement’s most elite units.

Hamas operated beneath Israel’s radar when it embarked on its
extensive project to dug these tunnels, but at the same time, it also
had to prepare its people for what these tunnels meant. Without
preparing a cadre of martyrs, who agree to sacrifice their lives for the
sake of jihad with Israel, the vast network of tunnels is neither
effective nor efficient. Indoctrinating hundreds of volunteers with the
idea of martyrdom requires no less a long and exhaustive investment as
building a tunnel. Operation Protective Edge not only uncovered the
terrorist tunnels but also the terrorists who Hamas has been training
over the years to operate through its network of tunnels.

The main question that remains is whether the theme of martyrdom will
also be adopted anew by the organization’s infrastructure in the West
Bank. Will the Hamas leadership encourage the military wing in the West
Bank to renew its terrorist attacks against Israel, like it did during
the second intifada? There can be no doubt that this time, with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
at the helm of the Palestinian Authority instead of Yasser Arafat, and
given the effectiveness of the Palestinian security forces, it will be
more difficult to send suicide bombers through the security fence to
launch attacks against Israel. Yet, though it will be more difficult, it
will not be impossible.

There are still many other questions that have yet to be answered.
For example, what is the role of the Palestinian media covering the
military operation in Gaza? Is it capable of swaying Palestinian public
opinion to oppose the corruption of Hamas and the movement’s warped
priorities, which include sacrificing the people of Gaza to achieve the
movement’s objectives?

As would only be expected, the Palestinian media highlights the
killing of Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip and the horrible
suffering imposed on the residents. And justifiably so. Nevertheless, it
is still disappointing that not a single Palestinian journalist has
thought to ask one particular question that is critical of the Hamas
regime: How is it that Hamas, which seized control of Gaza in a military
coup and invested all its resources in creating “underground Gaza,” could leave the people of Gaza aboveground so indigent and exposed?

Shlomi Eldar

Columnist 

Shlomi Eldar is a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Israel
Pulse. For the past two decades, he has covered the Palestinian
Authority and especially the Gaza Strip for Israel’s Channels 1 and 10,
reporting on the emergence of Hamas. In 2007, he was awarded the Sokolov
Prize, Israel’s most important media award, for this work.