The Syrian military, backed by Russian air power, is
giving priority to taking control of the Bayirbucak region by
intensifying offensive operations against Turkmens and other Syrian
armed groups, including al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra.


Metin Gurcan
summarizes the Syrian and Russian interests in taking this region in
advance of a possible cease-fire: “Studying the field developments and
listening to Russian decision-makers, one can discern three basic
reasons for this operation: to secure the Latakia region where Russia
has its largest military presence — to clean this mountainous and
densely forested area from opposition fighters is the prerequisite of
further Syrian regime and Russian moves toward Idlib and Aleppo; to expel Chechen Caucasian fighters from
Bayirbucak; and — according to Mehmet Akif Okur, assistant professor of
international relations at Gazi University — the desire of the Assad
regime to secure more defensible, expanded territory before an eventual
cease-fire as recommended in the Vienna meetings goes into effect.”
Turkey fears the loss of this region to Syrian government forces, and
the potential for further gains in northern Syria by Kurdish armed
groups backed by the United States. Fehim Tastekin
writes, “In response to the plans by the Kurdish People’s Protection
Units (YPG) to move westward and expel the Islamic State from Jarablus,
Turkey has declared the Euphrates River a red line for the Kurds. Once
it is cleared of IS, Turkey is planning to use the Turkmens to
control both these areas and the Azez-Aleppo line, which is being
considered for a buffer zone. Such plans naturally upped the value of
the Turkmen card. Turkey,
unable to prevent the Russian bombing against the groups supported by
the West and the Gulf, has pushed back with the Turkmens. But the
Russians ignored the Turkish moves and expanded their operations to
Turkmen Mountain.”
Syrian Turkmen opposition forces have served primarily as a Turkish
gendarmerie and protector of the Turkmen community in Syria. Tastekin
broke the story for Al-Monitor
in October 2014 that the much-heralded, at the time, commitment by
Turkey to “train and equip” opposition forces in Syria was actually a
means for the Turkish National Intelligence Organization to develop
Turkmen armed groups to oppose Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The
Turkmen groups have been nonexistent in the battle against IS and have
collaborated with Jabhat al-Nusra. Tastekin reports, “Turkmen units
participated in the Anfal operation on
March 21, 2014, by jihadist groups to capture the Armenian towns of
Kasab and Samra. In operations on Aug. 4-19, 2013, Alevi villages were
raided and some 200 civilians were killed. IS and Jabhat al-Nusra also
joined Turkmens in these attacks. Meanwhile, there was regular rocket
fire from Turkmen Mountain toward Latakia.”
As this column explained last week, Turkey has been scrambling since the Turkish air force shot down a Russian jet Nov. 24. Semih Idiz
reports that despite the platitudes of support from NATO, Turkey will
likely be expected to adapt its Syrian policies to match the priorities
of Western nations in the anti-IS coalition. “The support Ankara is
receiving from its Western allies may be comforting to [Turkish
President Recep] Erdogan and [Prime Minister Ahmet] Davutoglu, but it is
clear that this will also require them to overcome differences with the
West over Syria,” Idiz writes. “The main problem area for Turkey will
be to relegate the support it is giving to groups in northern Syria
fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime to the background and focus
exclusively on combating IS. In doing so, it will also have to come to
terms with the support the West is giving to the Syrian Kurds and their
Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is fighting IS with air support from
the US-led coalition. Ankara says the PYD is a terrorist organization
because of its links to the Kurdistan Workers Party. Turkey’s attempts
to ‘re-energize’ its ties with the EU, on the other hand, can only go so
far given Erdogan’s undemocratic policies that continue to unfold in
Turkey, starting with his escalating war against the free press.”

Metin Gurcan
provided probably the most detailed reporting to date on the
interaction of Russian and Turkish militaries prior to the Nov. 24
incident. He writes, “According to military sources Al-Monitor contacted
in Ankara, Turkish and Russian military officials held five meetings in
October in Ankara about violations of Turkish airspace by Russian
planes. When Russia did not heed four warnings by Turkey, in the fifth
meeting senior Russian officers were informed that the Turkish air force
would ‘strictly apply its rules of engagement.’ In an official
statement about those meetings, Turkish officers said,
‘In addition to other military issues, in our face-to-face meetings we
emphasized violations of Russian Federation planes of our airspace and
informed them of our determination to fully apply rules of engagement.’
After that fourth warning, military sources said, Russian planes did not
violate Turkish airspace again — until Nov. 24, when Turkey shot down
the Russian plane.”

Israel, Russia on “same page” in Syria
Ben Caspit reports that unlike Turkey, Israel and Russia are effectively coordinating their Syria policies.
“The Russians and Israelis are on the same page, at least for now,”
Caspit writes. “They see eye to eye about the situation, coordinate
their activities in real time, respect each other and give each other
the space they need. Israel does it mainly because it has no choice in
the matter. Russia does it because it neither needs nor wants to open
yet another front, in addition to all the other fronts it already opened
up in the region.”
Avigdor Liberman, a Knesset member, former foreign minister and
leading critic of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from the
right, told Caspit, “We have full coordination in real time with Russian
ground forces and the Russian air force. There is an open line of
communication between us, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I hope we
don’t find ourselves in the same situation as the Turks found themselves
with the Russians. I see no reason for that to happen though.
Everything the Russians have been signaling seems to focus on close
cooperation. Just this week, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin extended
sentencing for anti-Semitic acts in Russia. They want to import more
Israeli vegetables. They tell us that we’re not involved [in the
conflict], at least as far as they are concerned. Russia has no problem
with us. They are dealing with other interests.”
Caspit adds that Israel has conveyed its own red lines to Russia
regarding Hezbollah: “In various talks between the parties, including
the conversation between Putin and Netanyahu, Israel made it perfectly
clear that if any arms that could disrupt the delicate balance of power
(tiebreaking weapons) are transferred from East to West — i.e., from
Iran via Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to Hezbollah — it would
consider that to be a casus belli. So far, whenever Israel identified
such a transfer of arms, it attacked, claim foreign news sources,
usually on the Syrian side, since the ability to act defensively there
tends to zero. Then suddenly, the Russian bear entered the equation. It
knows how to defend itself, and to attack as well. The big question is
what will happen the next time that Israeli aircraft, manned or not, fly
over one of those arms convoys and are picked up on radar by the
Russian anti-aircraft batteries. All the parties hope that things will
work out, but reality has rules of its own. Sometimes events on the
ground dictate how the political level responds, and not the other way
around.”

Israel’s “small joy”
Akiva Eldar
writes this week about the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s decision to
reassess the European Union’s involvement in diplomacy with the
Palestinians as a result of the EU’s decision to label Israeli goods
manufactured in settlements.
“On reading this reaction, it is hard to decide whether to cry or
simply take offense,” Eldar writes. “To cry, because an attempt by a
small state in the Middle East to punish Europe for a decision supported
by 16 European foreign ministers and overwhelmingly adopted by the
European Parliament (by a vote of 525 to 70) brings to mind the
miserable fellow who cut off his nose to spite his face. Also to cry,
because the decision to keep the EU away from a ‘peace process with the
Palestinians’ is akin to a decision to distance Europe from a diplomatic
process between Israel and Syria. Both these processes are equally far-fetched.
To take offense, because the reactions to the decision illustrate the
politicians’ contempt for Israelis’ reading comprehension. The man who
presumes to lead them assumes they cannot tell the difference between
boycotting products and labels specifying where they are made.”
Eldar concludes, “Absent true willingness to confront the roots of
the crisis with the EU, settlement policy and the diplomatic stalemate,
the Israeli government is turning, joyfully, from being an occupier to
being a victim, from accused to accuser, from being punished to
punishing others. What a small joy.”