Stavridis’ military record exhibits all the signs of an accomplished
courtier, ably negotiating the reefs and shoals of service politics as
he shinned up the ranks faster even than David Petraeus.  The key
accelerant on his progress came in 2004, when he was picked by the
odious Larry di Rita, Rumsfeld’s Svengali-spokesman , as the secretary’s
Senior Military Assistant.  In the process, he was “frocked,” vaulting
from his former rank of one-star admiral straight to three stars – an
almost unprecedented leap.  Occupying this immensely powerful post,
Stavridis oversaw the secretary’s schedule, travel and, crucially,
controlled the flow of information reaching Rumsfeld’s desk.  Reveling
in the perks of his lofty position, Stavridis insisted on the provision
of a special car for himself in motorcades, while junior officers, whom
he importuned to do his shopping when traveling, staggered under the
weight of his bags.

In a gratifyingly acerbic memoir, “Speech-Less,”
former Rumsfeld speech writer Matthew Latimer recalls Stavridis’
assiduous toadying, offering fawning toasts to the secretary at dinners
on overseas trips and busying himself with such humble but
career-enhancing tasks as fixing a squeak in his master’s office chair.
He was, reports Latimer, “surprisingly political for a military man”
helping the speechwriters craft statements defending the secretary from
political attacks – his favorite word being “fabulous” – and taking
charge of a project to promote Rumsfeld’s accomplishments while also
penning reams of groveling mash-notes to the man himself. Promoting an
image as a “warrior-scholar,” he wrote fluently in the pablum that
passes for wisdom in the debased culture of the Washington
defense-intelligentsia.  Thus in 2005 his treatise “Deconstructing War,”
which opened with the fatuous proposition that “War is changing, and
not for the better” and headed downhill from there, won wide acclaim
among the Osrics of the think-tank/op-ed circuit.

In 2006, the hard work with chair-repair and mash-notes paid off when
he was nominated by the boss to head Southcom, the military satrapy
controlling Central and South America, not to mention Guantanamo, along
with a fourth star.  This was clearly the post for which he had been
angling; officemates had noticed him listening to Spanish-language tapes
for some months prior to the announcement. “This prompted some of us to
wonder,” recalled Latimer, “how long does it take to learn fabuloso?”

Obama brought change, but only for the better for “Stav” whose
courtship of the incoming team paid off in his apotheosis to SACEUR,
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, complete with lodging
befitting this imperial rank at Chateau Gendebien, set in 23 acres of
parkland, close by NATO headquarters at Mons, Belgium.  The job offered
perks far beyond those he had enjoyed in humbler days at Rumsfeld’s
feet, so much so that word of Stavridis’ habitual use of official jets
and other appurtenances for the private use of himself and family
eventually prompted an official investigation although, as is customary
with such probes of senior officers, he was totally absolved of any
blame or sanction.

Meanwhile, and unfortunately for the people of Libya, he was given
the opportunity to burnish the “warrior” part of his favored
appellation.  When Hillary Clinton fatefully bounced Obama into agreeing
to attack Libya, Stavridis was on point, overseeing the deployment of
Nato air power.  Later, he boasted in Foreign Affairs that “Nato’s
operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention. The
alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened
hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling against an oppressive
regime.  It succeeded in protecting those civilians.”  In reality, the
record clearly indicates that,
despite some bombastic rhetoric, Qaddafi did not in fact make any
attempt to massacre civilians, though he did use military force against
the Nato-supported armed rebellion. Nevertheless the operation left a
fatal legacy to democrats regarding the efficacy of interventionism, and
this despite Libya’s subsequent and entirely predictable descent into
bloody chaos and ascendant jihadism.

Retiring from the military in 2013, Stavridis eased into the Deanship
of the  Fletcher School, a perfect platform for ponderous ruminations
on modish topics such as “smart power” which he defines as combining
“hard power” with “soft power.”  Among his ongoing and remunerative
connections to the former is his chairmanship of the International
Advisory Board of mega-defense contractor Northrop-Grumman, whose
overseers can find little fault with Admiral Fabuloso’s enthusiastic
tub-thumping for the new cold war.  From Ukraine to Syria, “Stav” is in
the front lines, figuratively speaking, urging escalation against
Russia. The Ukrainians should have “lethal aid” from the U.S., he
announced in 2015, and when asked if that might not lead the Russians to
escalate in turn, he conceded blithely, “when you release ordnance,
everything changes.”

But it is the Syrian war that has excited the warrior-scholar’s most
martial instincts, an ominous indication of where the wind is blowing in
the national security set.  So eager is he to show that he is firmly on
board that he actually touts in public what others dare only murmur in
private: in confronting Russia for mastery of Syria, it’s OK to ally
with Al Nusra, as Al Qaeda calls itself in Syria.  “It is unlikely we
are going to operate side by side with cadres from Nusra, but if our
allies are working with them, that is acceptable,” he told Yaroslav
Trofimov of the Wall Street Journal in June last year. “I don’t
think that is a showstopper for the U.S. in terms of engaging with that
coalition.” Such is the intellectual bankruptcy of the Clinton campaign
on national security that this dangerous time-server should be deemed a
serious candidate for a slot on the ticket.