Egypt’s return of the
Red Sea islands of Tiran (foreground) and Sanafir (background) to Saudi
Arabian control has come with a political cost for Egyptian President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
(STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images)

The bridge proposal on April 8 garnered a lot of media attention,
but this is not the first time a grand plan to connect Saudi Arabia and
Egypt has been floated. During a 1988 summit, Saudi King Fahd and
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced plans to build such a span,
and in 2012, Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi revived the idea, but
neither proposal progressed to actual construction.
The past plans called variously for a bridge extending 25-50
kilometers (about 15-30 miles) in length and 100 meters (about 325 feet)
high with an anchor point on Tiran Island, or promised a railway, or
bypassed Tiran altogether. The new iterations are lacking a bridge
design and timeline, but those plans for a jointly built span carried an
estimated cost of $3 billion to $4 billion and a construction time of
seven years.
Meanwhile, the transfer of Tiran and Sanafir islands, which straddle
the strategic Straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, is the
culmination of 11 diplomatic meetings spanning six years. The transfer
was set in motion purportedly through a Saudi request for full control
of the islands in 1988.

Before modern Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 and before Egypt
was free from the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the islands and the waterways
around them were subject to Ottoman control. Following
Israel’s founding in 1948, an agreement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia
permitted Egypt to station a small contingent of troops on the islands
to protect them from potential Israeli aggression. After the Six-Day War
in 1967, Israel occupied Tiran Island and took control of the Straits
of Tiran. This lasted until the signing of the Camp David Accords in
1978. A small multinational peacekeeping force, mostly U.S. troops with
some Egyptian forces, has been stationed on the islands since 1982.

Despite the strategic significance of the islands, the building of a
bridge would have little effect on the military balance of power among
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. Though Israeli media in past
years had raised the concern that such a bridge could violate the Camp
David Accords, Israeli officials have issued no objections to the recent
bridge plan nor to the transfer of the islands. According to Egyptian
newspaper Al Ahram, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
promised that his country would continue to respect the presence of the
multinational force on the island and ensure the safe passage of ships
from the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aqaba, on which Jordan’s only port,
Aqaba, and Israel’s only port with direct Red Sea access, Eilat, are
situated. Israel’s government reportedly was warned of the transfer well
before an agreement was struck.

If the current bridge were to follow previous plans, it would not
violate provisions of the Camp David Accords guaranteeing the right of
navigation of the straits. When Mubarak abandoned plans to build the
bridge in 2005, citing the damage to coral reefs that its construction
would cause, the bridge was set to be 100 meters high. That would leave
ample room for military and cargo ships of all types to pass. (By
comparison, San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge has a clearance of 67
meters.)
Other strategic military concerns would arise only in the event of a
conflict in either nation that required the deployment of the other’s
troops. A bridge between Egypt and Saudi Arabia could cut the transit
time and cost to move personnel and materiel between the countries.
Egypt has time and again sworn to protect Saudi Arabia in the event of a
territorial breach, and though no such conflict is on the horizon,
Saudi Arabia has been carefully marshaling as much support as it can to
ensure it has friends near and far with military power to spare. As for
any military utility of Tiran and Sanafir, Saudi Arabia already has
artillery set up on its mainland that can cover the straits.

The ostensible purpose for building the bridge is economic, easing
trade and fueling job growth. The head of the Saudi-Egyptian business
council said April 12 in Cairo that Saudi Arabia wishes to create
320,000 jobs over the next five years, with a focus on the northern
Sinai region, where instability and extremist activity
fueled by poverty are of concern to both nations. In an address to
Egypt’s parliament touting the job-creation benefits of a bridge, King
Salman called for the establishment of a free-trade zone in the region.
Facilitating the delivery of Egyptian goods to Saudi Arabia has
always been part of the plan for the bridge, but it is unclear how much
the project would help increase their flow. Just getting goods to the
span would be a relatively long trip on bad roads through mountainous
desert terrain. Sinai militants could also target some travelers for
raids, diminishing the benefits of a trade route.
A potential boon, however, would be an increased number of hajj
tourists traveling overland from Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Most hajj
tourists from Egypt currently fly to Saudi Arabia, but some would opt
for the overland route even though the savings for them might be
minimal.

That Egypt’s government was willing to incur the political cost of
ceding control of the islands to its neighbor shows just how far Saudi
Arabia has drawn Egypt into its bloc of Sunni nations. In Egypt, critics
have seized upon what they see as al-Sisi’s capitulation to Egypt’s
wealthier patron and his surrender of sovereign Egyptian territory. Some
claim that giving up the islands is a breach of Egypt’s Constitution,
which prohibits the sale of public land, and a protest in Cairo over the
agreement led to five arrests. A challenge to the accord will be heard
May 17 in a Cairo administrative court. The protests, court case and
media criticism are coming at a time when al-Sisi is facing a broad loss
of popularity in Egypt. According to Stratfor sources, Egypt’s Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces advised al-Sisi to hold off on the transfer
of the islands, which it said could harm national pride and upset the
public. The timing of the agreement, in conjunction with the
announcement of sizable Saudi investments in Egypt, has driven the
perception of the transfer being more like a sale.
Defenders of the deal have pointed out that there was never a sale of
the islands and that the islands had been considered Saudi territory
before 1950. Egypt’s current economic struggles make it dependent on the
largesse of its patrons for survival and give it fewer options than it
had when it was wealthier and more self-sufficient.
The current bridge plan could join the ranks of its predecessors —
proposed with the best of intentions but remaining unbuilt. Saudi
Arabia’s finances, after all, are not what they used to be, and the
economic benefits to be reaped from such a bridge seem far-fetched at
best. But the political cost to the Egyptian government for its decision
on the islands will continue to haunt it in the months to come, as
Egyptians see their own government as having betrayed the country’s
sovereignty.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/building-bridges-between-egypt-and-saudi-arabia