Κουρδιστάν (Κουρδικό Ζήτημα, Αμπντουλλάχ Οτζαλάν)
31 Δεκεμβρίου 2015
Mosul: Turkey’s Fulda Gap
“Our national borders pass through Antioch and span east-ward, containing Mosul, Sulaymaniya, Kirkuk. We say: This, is our national border.”
— Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (December 28, 1919 – National Liberation Speech)
Mosul as a key connector between Turkish FOBs. Highways and roads render Mosul a key logistics hub.
The “National Pact” (Misak-ı Milli) is a six-article manifesto
of Turkey’s War of National Liberation, accepted by the defeated, but
defiant, Ottoman Parliament in January 1920, outlining the bare minimum
of conditions Turkish nationalists agreed upon to end World War I. It
was bypassed and ignored by the Ottoman palace, which instead signed the
Sevres Treaty
in August 1920, creating the great schism between the palace and the
nationalists, leading to the eventual triumph of the latter under
Mustafa Kemal’s leadership.
There were several printed versions of the
pact in 1920 that had different interpretations of borders as laid out
in the 1918 Mudros Armistice between the Ottomans and the Allied Powers.
Ankara’s version, for example, included the Vilayet (Mosul, Kirkuk
and Sulaymaniya) as part of Turkish national borders, whereas the
Istanbul version was unclear about its status. Since the Mosul Vilayet
was still under the control of the Ottoman forces at the time of signing
the Mudros Armistice, the nationalist consensus was that these areas
had to be incorporated into the new Turkish state. However, following
British diplomatic engagements, the Ottoman palace had ordered the 6th
Army to withdraw from the Vilayet of Mosul in favor of a British
contingent, which occupied the city in November 1918.
of Turkey’s War of National Liberation, accepted by the defeated, but
defiant, Ottoman Parliament in January 1920, outlining the bare minimum
of conditions Turkish nationalists agreed upon to end World War I. It
was bypassed and ignored by the Ottoman palace, which instead signed the
Sevres Treaty
in August 1920, creating the great schism between the palace and the
nationalists, leading to the eventual triumph of the latter under
Mustafa Kemal’s leadership.
There were several printed versions of the
pact in 1920 that had different interpretations of borders as laid out
in the 1918 Mudros Armistice between the Ottomans and the Allied Powers.
Ankara’s version, for example, included the Vilayet (Mosul, Kirkuk
and Sulaymaniya) as part of Turkish national borders, whereas the
Istanbul version was unclear about its status. Since the Mosul Vilayet
was still under the control of the Ottoman forces at the time of signing
the Mudros Armistice, the nationalist consensus was that these areas
had to be incorporated into the new Turkish state. However, following
British diplomatic engagements, the Ottoman palace had ordered the 6th
Army to withdraw from the Vilayet of Mosul in favor of a British
contingent, which occupied the city in November 1918.
The status of Mosul and
Kirkuk were unresolved in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which suggested
that the matter should be resolved bilaterally between Britain and the
Turkish nationalist movement. In May 1924, both sides came together for
the Istanbul Conference to resolve the dispute, which failed due to a
number of revolts against the British rule in Mosul. Then, the matter
was forwarded to the League of Nations, where Turkish nationalists
favored a self-determination referendum in Mosul — which was rejected by
the British, who asked for a fact-finding mission to determine its
status. The League of Nations mission concluded eventually that the
Turks had no right to claim Mosul. They awarded the vilayet to the
British, amidst intense Turkish protest. Since then, for Turkey, Mosul
has been separated from Turkey’s national borders artificially and
illegally, without an agreement, but through a fait accompli.
This is the reason why, even today, Ankara sees the boundaries of the
Ottoman Mosul Vilayet as a part of its natural zone of influence, if not
within its real borders.
Kirkuk were unresolved in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which suggested
that the matter should be resolved bilaterally between Britain and the
Turkish nationalist movement. In May 1924, both sides came together for
the Istanbul Conference to resolve the dispute, which failed due to a
number of revolts against the British rule in Mosul. Then, the matter
was forwarded to the League of Nations, where Turkish nationalists
favored a self-determination referendum in Mosul — which was rejected by
the British, who asked for a fact-finding mission to determine its
status. The League of Nations mission concluded eventually that the
Turks had no right to claim Mosul. They awarded the vilayet to the
British, amidst intense Turkish protest. Since then, for Turkey, Mosul
has been separated from Turkey’s national borders artificially and
illegally, without an agreement, but through a fait accompli.
This is the reason why, even today, Ankara sees the boundaries of the
Ottoman Mosul Vilayet as a part of its natural zone of influence, if not
within its real borders.
Since 1994, however,
Turkish troops have had a de facto presence in the old Vilayet of Mosul,
manning a number of outposts, defensive positions, and training camps.
The Ba’ashiqa base, which recently appeared in the headlines following
Baghdad’s outrage over Ankara’s decision to reinforce the base, is one
of several front-line outposts built by Ankara in the 1990s as a part of
its campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Today, in the
Mexican standoff between the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the
Peshmarga, the PKK, and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, these
outposts act as forward operating bases (FOBs) for Turkey.
They are aimed primarily at holding the PKK in check while providing
training to the Peshmerga of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
and gathering intelligence on the Islamic State in Mosul.
Turkish troops have had a de facto presence in the old Vilayet of Mosul,
manning a number of outposts, defensive positions, and training camps.
The Ba’ashiqa base, which recently appeared in the headlines following
Baghdad’s outrage over Ankara’s decision to reinforce the base, is one
of several front-line outposts built by Ankara in the 1990s as a part of
its campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Today, in the
Mexican standoff between the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the
Peshmarga, the PKK, and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, these
outposts act as forward operating bases (FOBs) for Turkey.
They are aimed primarily at holding the PKK in check while providing
training to the Peshmerga of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
and gathering intelligence on the Islamic State in Mosul.
Large
PKK access zone (RED) across Turkish-Iraqi-Iranian rugged border. Once
PKK penetrates through the green lines within the KRG, it becomes
difficult to track or stop them until they reach the red lines.
Twenty years after their
establishment, Turkish FOBs in places like Sulaymaniya, Bamerni, Zakho,
Dohuk, and Kanimasi hold an unknown number of troops and intelligence
officers who rotate on a regular basis. These bases (specifically the
base in Ba’ashiqa overlooking Mosul) have been subject to much
controversy recently, as Turkey reinforced the FOB with around 150
additional troops and 25 armored vehicles in early December. Baghdad criticized the move,
arguing that such reinforcement is outside the scope of Iraq’s existing
deal with Turkey. Heated rhetoric out of Baghdad portrayed Turkish
forces as hostile invaders.
establishment, Turkish FOBs in places like Sulaymaniya, Bamerni, Zakho,
Dohuk, and Kanimasi hold an unknown number of troops and intelligence
officers who rotate on a regular basis. These bases (specifically the
base in Ba’ashiqa overlooking Mosul) have been subject to much
controversy recently, as Turkey reinforced the FOB with around 150
additional troops and 25 armored vehicles in early December. Baghdad criticized the move,
arguing that such reinforcement is outside the scope of Iraq’s existing
deal with Turkey. Heated rhetoric out of Baghdad portrayed Turkish
forces as hostile invaders.
Much of this
outburst follows the downing of the Russian jet by Turkey on November
24, and Russia’s decision to increase pressure on Ankara within Syria
and Iraq. Despite Turkey’s attempts to clarify the situation with
Baghdad by sending the undersecretaries of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this didn’t stop a large rally in Baghdad on December 12, during which Turkish flags were burned.
The same day Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi appealed to the
United Nations, with Russia’s help, and asked the Security Council to
force Turkey to withdraw its forces
from Iraqi territory, specifically Ba’ashiqa. Turkey stated that it
would withdraw extra reinforcements but retain the minimum training
personnel there. On December 16, Islamic State forces launched a Katyusha barrage
on the FOB, wounding (according to different reports) four Turkish
soldiers as well as killing an unknown number of volunteers and
trainees. Soon after the attack, both the Islamic State and Ketaeb
Hezbollah in Iraq claimed responsibility.
Then on December 27, the Islamic State launched a second rocket attack
on the same FOB, this time in a more audacious fashion, showing off
drone footage of their makeshift Katyusha barrage on Youtube. One Al-Hashd al-Watani member died, along with one Turkish soldier wounded. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted that the attack changes nothing and that Turkish troops would stay in Iraq until the liberation of Mosul.
outburst follows the downing of the Russian jet by Turkey on November
24, and Russia’s decision to increase pressure on Ankara within Syria
and Iraq. Despite Turkey’s attempts to clarify the situation with
Baghdad by sending the undersecretaries of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this didn’t stop a large rally in Baghdad on December 12, during which Turkish flags were burned.
The same day Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi appealed to the
United Nations, with Russia’s help, and asked the Security Council to
force Turkey to withdraw its forces
from Iraqi territory, specifically Ba’ashiqa. Turkey stated that it
would withdraw extra reinforcements but retain the minimum training
personnel there. On December 16, Islamic State forces launched a Katyusha barrage
on the FOB, wounding (according to different reports) four Turkish
soldiers as well as killing an unknown number of volunteers and
trainees. Soon after the attack, both the Islamic State and Ketaeb
Hezbollah in Iraq claimed responsibility.
Then on December 27, the Islamic State launched a second rocket attack
on the same FOB, this time in a more audacious fashion, showing off
drone footage of their makeshift Katyusha barrage on Youtube. One Al-Hashd al-Watani member died, along with one Turkish soldier wounded. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted that the attack changes nothing and that Turkish troops would stay in Iraq until the liberation of Mosul.
There is an important
historical dimension to this episode that is too often ignored by
Western observers. Turkey feels the phantom limb syndrome in Mosul,
which would have remained within the Turkish Republican borders had
Britain not forced otherwise through the 1926 Ankara Agreement. And yes,
Turkey feels the same syndrome since it “lost” Mosul for a second time
in June 2014, when ISIL captured the town, overran
the Turkish consulate, and kidnapped the Turkish consul-general, along
with 49 consulate employees. And also yes, Turkey wants to avenge this
by playing a dominant role in the liberation of Mosul, both from its own
historical perspective and to increase its political influence in
Baghdad.
historical dimension to this episode that is too often ignored by
Western observers. Turkey feels the phantom limb syndrome in Mosul,
which would have remained within the Turkish Republican borders had
Britain not forced otherwise through the 1926 Ankara Agreement. And yes,
Turkey feels the same syndrome since it “lost” Mosul for a second time
in June 2014, when ISIL captured the town, overran
the Turkish consulate, and kidnapped the Turkish consul-general, along
with 49 consulate employees. And also yes, Turkey wants to avenge this
by playing a dominant role in the liberation of Mosul, both from its own
historical perspective and to increase its political influence in
Baghdad.
However, outside all of
these considerations lies a key geopolitical factor, which is that Mosul
is Turkey’s “Fulda Gap.” The original Fulda Gap
is a strategic corridor in Germany, which was one of the main
flashpoints of the Cold War, where the Soviets were expected to launch a
tank offensive on West Germany. The geography of the Fulda Gap — two
corridors of flat terrain — was conducive for a rapid mechanized attack,
and was also historically important since it was through this gap that
Napoleon had withdrawn his armies after the Battle of Leipzig and
escaped to France. With a major Fulda Gap tank battle in mind, NATO had developed a plethora of anti-tank weaponry, including aerial tank busters such as the AH-64 Apache and the A-10 Warthog.
these considerations lies a key geopolitical factor, which is that Mosul
is Turkey’s “Fulda Gap.” The original Fulda Gap
is a strategic corridor in Germany, which was one of the main
flashpoints of the Cold War, where the Soviets were expected to launch a
tank offensive on West Germany. The geography of the Fulda Gap — two
corridors of flat terrain — was conducive for a rapid mechanized attack,
and was also historically important since it was through this gap that
Napoleon had withdrawn his armies after the Battle of Leipzig and
escaped to France. With a major Fulda Gap tank battle in mind, NATO had developed a plethora of anti-tank weaponry, including aerial tank busters such as the AH-64 Apache and the A-10 Warthog.
Mosul and other Turkish FOBs in Iraq serve a similar purpose. Although the new Turkish Republic’s 1926 Ankara Agreement
with Britain intended to amend the League of Nations decision on Mosul
in favor of Turkey, it has remained an extremely rugged and porous
border passing right through the entire northern end of the Zagros
Mountains. Through much of Turkey’s Republican history, the
Turkish–Iraqi border has been practically uncontrollable with frequent
activities of smuggling and banditry. This wasn’t much of a problem until 1984, when Turkey’s long-standing policy of centralization towards its Kurds, coupled with the brutality of the 1980 military coup, led to the emergence of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party — the PKK. Its leaders fled Turkey before the 1980 coup to take refuge in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. The PKK later seized the opportunity of the Gulf War and relocated to the mountains of northern Iraq.
Benefiting from the massive Kurdish refugee crisis of the Gulf War, as
well as the large arms caches Saddam’s army left behind, the PKK
exponentially increased its scope and initiated one of the deadliest and longest insurgencies in the Middle East through the 1990s.
with Britain intended to amend the League of Nations decision on Mosul
in favor of Turkey, it has remained an extremely rugged and porous
border passing right through the entire northern end of the Zagros
Mountains. Through much of Turkey’s Republican history, the
Turkish–Iraqi border has been practically uncontrollable with frequent
activities of smuggling and banditry. This wasn’t much of a problem until 1984, when Turkey’s long-standing policy of centralization towards its Kurds, coupled with the brutality of the 1980 military coup, led to the emergence of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party — the PKK. Its leaders fled Turkey before the 1980 coup to take refuge in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon. The PKK later seized the opportunity of the Gulf War and relocated to the mountains of northern Iraq.
Benefiting from the massive Kurdish refugee crisis of the Gulf War, as
well as the large arms caches Saddam’s army left behind, the PKK
exponentially increased its scope and initiated one of the deadliest and longest insurgencies in the Middle East through the 1990s.
Mosul as a key connector between Turkish FOBs. Highways and roads render Mosul a key logistics hub.
Turkey responded to PKK
attacks both through security operations in Turkey, as well as
cross-border operations in Iraqi territory. The first of such operations
was the 1992 “Scrape Off Campaign,” which was followed by the 1995 “Operation Steel” and 1997 “Operation Hammer,”
all of which featured a growing number of soldiers and more advanced
equipment. During these operations, the need emerged to coordinate with
the northern Iraqi Kurds, specifically Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and their militias, along with establishing
permanent FOBs in northern Iraq. Over time, these FOBs grew into
specific functions that their locations necessitated. FOBs closer to the
border (such as Batufa, Kaniması, Duhok, and Sheladize) filled combat and reconnaissance
roles, whereas FOBs deeper within KRG territory (such as Ba’ashiqa,
Selahaddin, and Raniyah) grew to have intelligence as well as training and coordination
functions. While Ankara had to deal with a larger and better-armed
insurgency internally, without these FOBs, these outpost bases
significantly reduce the PKK’s ability to coordinate and arm within Iraq
and mitigate its ability to carry out large-scale attacks within
Turkey.
Similar to the loss of
the Fulda Gap, the loss of the Mosul–Erbil line as a frontier defensive
and intelligence position meant Turkey had to deal with the PKK
domestically, in Adıyaman, Elazığ, or Bingöl, instead of within the
Matina–Gara–Zap line, which lies in Iraqi territory. In other words, the
FOBs enable Turkey to contain the PKK outside of Turkey, without having
to deal with a much stronger insurgency domestically.
the Fulda Gap, the loss of the Mosul–Erbil line as a frontier defensive
and intelligence position meant Turkey had to deal with the PKK
domestically, in Adıyaman, Elazığ, or Bingöl, instead of within the
Matina–Gara–Zap line, which lies in Iraqi territory. In other words, the
FOBs enable Turkey to contain the PKK outside of Turkey, without having
to deal with a much stronger insurgency domestically.
Mosul and Ba’ashiqa are
perhaps the most central links of this FOB network. Up until the loss of
Mosul, Turkey’s intelligence and operational network there connected
Erbil and Dohuk nodes to coordinate them against PKK movements across
northern Iraq. It also connected Mosul and Kirkuk nodes to cover the Makhmour
refugee camp area, which has long been a major recruiting and supply
area for the PKK. The Mosul–Erbil line was in many ways a Fulda Gap: It
held strategically and geographically key forward operating positions.
The loss of Mosul not only created a disconnect between Erbil and Dohuk
operational nodes, but also between Mosul and Kirkuk. Without the
geographic and infrastructure advantage of Mosul, Turkish efforts had
concentrated on the closest base, Ba’ashiqa. But with the most recent
row with Baghdad, Ankara was forced to clear out all FOBs from Iraq.
perhaps the most central links of this FOB network. Up until the loss of
Mosul, Turkey’s intelligence and operational network there connected
Erbil and Dohuk nodes to coordinate them against PKK movements across
northern Iraq. It also connected Mosul and Kirkuk nodes to cover the Makhmour
refugee camp area, which has long been a major recruiting and supply
area for the PKK. The Mosul–Erbil line was in many ways a Fulda Gap: It
held strategically and geographically key forward operating positions.
The loss of Mosul not only created a disconnect between Erbil and Dohuk
operational nodes, but also between Mosul and Kirkuk. Without the
geographic and infrastructure advantage of Mosul, Turkish efforts had
concentrated on the closest base, Ba’ashiqa. But with the most recent
row with Baghdad, Ankara was forced to clear out all FOBs from Iraq.
The fate of Turkish FOBs
also suffers from Turkey’s PKK myopia in a region with multi-layered
security threats. While these bases were established in the 1990s with
the PKK in mind, there are now PKK offshoots such as the YPG (Yekîneyên
Parastina Gel — People’s Protection Units) and PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya
Demokrat — Democratic Union Party) in Syria, which creates a geographic
connection through the Zakho–Malikiyah–Qamishli line, flanking Turkey’s
existing FOB network within the territory of the KRG. Also flanked by
the Islamic State in the south along the Tal Afar–Mosul–Qaraqosh line,
Turkey’s strategic position in Iraq seems enveloped, necessitating a
reconsideration of these FOBs’ geographic location and the safety of the
troops stationed there. The most recent Katyusha attack by the Islamic
State on Ba’ashiqa has been a sobering incident.
also suffers from Turkey’s PKK myopia in a region with multi-layered
security threats. While these bases were established in the 1990s with
the PKK in mind, there are now PKK offshoots such as the YPG (Yekîneyên
Parastina Gel — People’s Protection Units) and PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya
Demokrat — Democratic Union Party) in Syria, which creates a geographic
connection through the Zakho–Malikiyah–Qamishli line, flanking Turkey’s
existing FOB network within the territory of the KRG. Also flanked by
the Islamic State in the south along the Tal Afar–Mosul–Qaraqosh line,
Turkey’s strategic position in Iraq seems enveloped, necessitating a
reconsideration of these FOBs’ geographic location and the safety of the
troops stationed there. The most recent Katyusha attack by the Islamic
State on Ba’ashiqa has been a sobering incident.
All this calculus sits
atop the emergence of the YPG as the most active fighting force on the
ground against the Islamic State, and the fact that both the United
States and Russia have been competing
to emerge as the protector of Syrian Kurds. While Turkey’s objection to
this, citing the PKK connection of both groups, has forced Washington
to withhold such support, Turkey’s internal security operations in urban
areas — and the civilian casualties they produce — has left NATO in an awkward position. With both U.S. and Russian planes coordinating with the Syrian Kurds in one way or another, and as Turkish security operations mount civilian casualties,
Ankara is rapidly exhausting its political capital vis-à-vis shaping
regional politics along its security priorities. The best example of
this has been Washington’s call to Ankara to vacate the Ba’ashiqa camp as soon as possible.
atop the emergence of the YPG as the most active fighting force on the
ground against the Islamic State, and the fact that both the United
States and Russia have been competing
to emerge as the protector of Syrian Kurds. While Turkey’s objection to
this, citing the PKK connection of both groups, has forced Washington
to withhold such support, Turkey’s internal security operations in urban
areas — and the civilian casualties they produce — has left NATO in an awkward position. With both U.S. and Russian planes coordinating with the Syrian Kurds in one way or another, and as Turkish security operations mount civilian casualties,
Ankara is rapidly exhausting its political capital vis-à-vis shaping
regional politics along its security priorities. The best example of
this has been Washington’s call to Ankara to vacate the Ba’ashiqa camp as soon as possible.
While
Turkish FOBs were established in the 1990s with the PKK in mind, now it
is outflanked by two new strategic access zones: Syrian-Kurdish and
ISIL.
Ankara never calculated
that the ending of its “peace process” with the Kurds would be a
significant matter. After all, if the Kurds didn’t behave politically, a
range of armed options could always be used against them.
Marginalization of the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) and
criminalization of its activities or its elected representatives had
virtually no repercussions within or outside Turkey — or so Ankara
thought. The spiral of violence in Turkey, its repeated policy failures
in Syria, and developments in the aftermath of the downing of the
Russian jet all acted as multipliers and created a chain reaction across
Turkey’s diverse set of strategic shortcomings. The entry of a more
aggressive Russian policy into the region’s calculus through Tehran,
Baghdad, and Damascus acts as a multiplier on almost all of Turkey’s
security and policy problems. One of these problems is the possibility
of the loss of Turkey’s Iraqi “Fulda Gap,” which holds its critical
forward defensive and intelligence positions against the PKK. With
NATO’s gradual loss of patience towards an erratic Turkish policy in
Syria, combined with Turkey’s domestic heavy-handedness towards the
Kurds, Ankara is losing its strategic center of gravity, and its
autonomy in determining its own security policy.
that the ending of its “peace process” with the Kurds would be a
significant matter. After all, if the Kurds didn’t behave politically, a
range of armed options could always be used against them.
Marginalization of the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) and
criminalization of its activities or its elected representatives had
virtually no repercussions within or outside Turkey — or so Ankara
thought. The spiral of violence in Turkey, its repeated policy failures
in Syria, and developments in the aftermath of the downing of the
Russian jet all acted as multipliers and created a chain reaction across
Turkey’s diverse set of strategic shortcomings. The entry of a more
aggressive Russian policy into the region’s calculus through Tehran,
Baghdad, and Damascus acts as a multiplier on almost all of Turkey’s
security and policy problems. One of these problems is the possibility
of the loss of Turkey’s Iraqi “Fulda Gap,” which holds its critical
forward defensive and intelligence positions against the PKK. With
NATO’s gradual loss of patience towards an erratic Turkish policy in
Syria, combined with Turkey’s domestic heavy-handedness towards the
Kurds, Ankara is losing its strategic center of gravity, and its
autonomy in determining its own security policy.
Although the United States and the European Union are currently silent over the civilian toll of the security operations, history and statistics tells us
that there is a limited time window for such silence. Washington has
already asked Turkey to leave the Ba’ashiqa camp as well as other
KRG-bound reinforcements. Turkey complied, but Ankara is still largely
confused over whether Washington agrees with Baghdad’s demand that all
Turkish troops in the region have to be withdrawn, or only the
reinforcing troops. Turkish officials recently stated that pulling all
Turkish troops from the KRG would be out of the question,
and that the withdrawal from Ba’ashiqa is merely redeployment, intended
to return back to Ba’ashiqa at a future date. As Russian-Iranian
pressure over Baghdad, over Turkey’s presence in Iraq, intensifies, it
is unclear whether Washington will ask Turkey to follow suit and pull
back even more troops.
that there is a limited time window for such silence. Washington has
already asked Turkey to leave the Ba’ashiqa camp as well as other
KRG-bound reinforcements. Turkey complied, but Ankara is still largely
confused over whether Washington agrees with Baghdad’s demand that all
Turkish troops in the region have to be withdrawn, or only the
reinforcing troops. Turkish officials recently stated that pulling all
Turkish troops from the KRG would be out of the question,
and that the withdrawal from Ba’ashiqa is merely redeployment, intended
to return back to Ba’ashiqa at a future date. As Russian-Iranian
pressure over Baghdad, over Turkey’s presence in Iraq, intensifies, it
is unclear whether Washington will ask Turkey to follow suit and pull
back even more troops.
To that end, Turkey’s
internal Kurdish policy seems to be coming home to roost in the form of
FOBs in Iraq and the loss of Turkey’s frontier defensive line against
the PKK, this time with an aggressive Russia and increasingly apathetic
NATO. Mosul is critical for Turkey, and if Washington forces Turkish
troop withdrawals from Iraqi territory, it should offer an alternative
to limit PKK incursions into Turkish territory. Such an arrangement may
in turn force Turkey to take extra precautions in limiting civilian
casualties or combat in civilian areas, and above all, to restart its
peace process with the Kurds.
internal Kurdish policy seems to be coming home to roost in the form of
FOBs in Iraq and the loss of Turkey’s frontier defensive line against
the PKK, this time with an aggressive Russia and increasingly apathetic
NATO. Mosul is critical for Turkey, and if Washington forces Turkish
troop withdrawals from Iraqi territory, it should offer an alternative
to limit PKK incursions into Turkish territory. Such an arrangement may
in turn force Turkey to take extra precautions in limiting civilian
casualties or combat in civilian areas, and above all, to restart its
peace process with the Kurds.
*Note: All maps were created by the author from information available from open sources.
H. Akın Ünver ([email protected]) is an assistant professor of international relations at Kadir University, Istanbul and the author of Defining Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Discourse and Politics Since 1990 (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2015)
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