Yet during recent secret talks with Kerry, Netanyahu showed
surprising flexibility on the issue of the borders of a future
Palestinian state. According to senior sources at the State Department,
the Likud leader agreed that the borders would be based on the 1967
lines, with mutually agreed land swaps.
Netanyahu indeed sought progress toward a two-state solution, although
with unrealistic conditions in regard to the size of the settlement
blocs and on the future of Jerusalem.

Officials who have the prime minister’s ear today, however,
speak of the two-state solution approach in the past tense. Netanyahu
will, according to them, talk of a two-state solution at most as lip
service to his more moderate coalition partners and in his shaky
dialogue with Washington. The prime minister is expected to resume his
focus on a defensive policy argument, presenting a dangerous
“Hamas-stan” both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. He will also
ask the international community for a gradual demilitarization of Gaza
and make the case for “Israel-only” supervision of the future
demilitarization of the West Bank, which for all intents and purposes
means the continuation of the occupation. Settlements will be expanded with less fanfare and more vigor.

Senior sources in the Likud close to the settler movement
claim that they are developing concrete plans for the alternative to a
two-state solution. Palestinian citizens will have citizenship in an
autonomous Palestinian area, which will comprise 40-50% of the West
Bank. Only 50,000 Palestinians living today in Area C will be offered
Israeli citizenship. Israel, according to these right-wing political
circles, will assist Palestinian autonomy to develop economically in
what is called “economic peace.” The prime minister is aware of these
plans, yet in typical fashion, he will not adhere to them or to the
two-state solution.

There are several reasons for the return of the “good old Bibi”: growing mistrust in Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as a partner; no lesser suspicion of the Barack Obama administration
(so it is not difficult to guess who Netanyahu hopes will win the
midterm congressional elections); and — perhaps the most important
aspect of this undeclared policy change — the assumption around the
prime minister of the eventuality, and even desirability, of early
elections in 2015. That, in the Bibi camp, is the best way to secure him
a third term. He now needs to reach out to his natural base on the
right and balance the image of relative moderation that characterized
his handling of the Gaza war.

Naturally, Netanyahu will not speak of a binational state,
although that seems to be the direction his policies will take the
country. The Palestinian leadership is well aware of this trajectory and
never suspected anything else. In Ramallah as well, there is talk of a
policy that leads to a binational state.
It exists in the following circles: Fatah veteran leaders, who see no
hope for a two-state solution; officials close to Abbas, who want to use
the eventuality of a binational state as tactical pressure on Israel
and the United States; and hard-liners in Fatah’s young guard, who actually believe in such a vision and count on the Arab demographic edge.

This eventuality in Palestine is not ruled out by some and
is preferred by others. Palestinian policy planning experts have begun
to prepare for a binational state process. These plans focus on the
share of authorities and powers between the Israeli and Palestinian
parts of the binational state. They are consulting experts on
international law as to how to ensure, through the international
community, equal rights for Palestinian citizens. An anti-apartheid
state campaign is envisioned, adopting the South African model to Palestine.

US officials are fully aware of these policy developments
in Jerusalem and Ramallah. In the view of State Department officials,
the trend toward a binational state is more possible and dangerous than
ever. They do not think that a binational state with equal rights is at
all realistic and therefore warn, like Kerry, of an Israeli apartheid
state. This prospect would not only contradict President Obama’s
international human rights policy, but also jeopardize US interest in
the region and in the world. US-Israeli relations would come under
strong criticism from all the Arab countries as well as the European
Union.

Is this prospect dangerous enough to prompt the US administration
to engage in a serious peace process attempt to obtain a two-state
solution? The answer is most probably the negative. At the very least,
however, it will lead to more forceful communications from the Oval
Office and State Department to convince the prime minister’s office in
Jerusalem and the Muqata in Ramallah to pursue policies that at least
leave the door open to a two-state solution and refrain from unilateral
acts to the contrary.