Israeli soldiers stand next to a hole in the ground they suspect is connected to a tunnel, outside the Gaza Strip, Aug. 10, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Amir Cohen)

The most important phase began during the second week of the war, on July 17, with the ground invasion that resulted in losses for both sides.
The progress of clashes in Gaza and the fierce fighting that ensued
between al-Qassam fighters and the Israeli army showed that Hamas
possessed a significant fighting capability on the ground. Once battles
erupted on the outskirts of the Shajaiya, al-Tuffah, Khuza’a, and Beit
Hanoun neighborhoods, the Israelis suffered a number of casualties,
with soldiers and officers of elite brigades wounded or killed, armored
vehicles destroyed and positions of special forces targeted with
rockets, explosives and snipers.

The tunnels were a main strength that Hamas employed against the Israeli army, despite the latter’s preparation for this challenge, and its announcement that targeting those tunnels
was one of the objectives of the ongoing war. Israel destroyed a large
number of tunnels up until the end of the ground offensive on Aug. 5,
particularly those located along the border.
Abu al-Laith, a Hamas military commander, told local reporters that
the movement was ready to continue its confrontation with Israel, with
thousands of men willing to fight. He said that the al-Qassam Brigades
had retained a weapons stockpile
in case truce negotiations failed, because “we have prepared ourselves
for a long battle, and we can target Israeli cities that were spared
during the war, as well as breach the Israeli border again. We possess
more rockets than the enemy thinks we do, and we have used only 10% of
our available force.”

Al-Qassam field commander Abu Jihad told Al-Monitor, “Israel’s
allegations that it destroyed the tunnel network are inaccurate and
aimed at local consumption to reassure Israelis that the war was progressing well.
To determine the truth, all they have to do is embark on a wide-scale
ground offensive in Gaza, for we have prepared a wide array of tunnels
5-25 meters [16-82 feet] deep, which allow our fighters to move about
the battleground undetected. It is true that Israel destroyed a number
of those tunnels, but the strategic ones are undamaged and have retained
their full logistical capacity, in as far as available water supply,
food, weapons, ventilation systems and electricity.”

It is interesting to note that, in this war, unlike the previous wars
in 2008 and 2012, the al-Qassam Brigades did not divulge the names and
numbers of its dead, nor did they allude to them in any way, except
through unofficial activist posts and pictures on Facebook. It is well
known, however, that they number in the dozens, with medical sources in
Gaza confirming to Al-Monitor that corpses in uniform were brought to
hospitals.

Al-Monitor also learned from Gaza security sources that rescue
workers were still removing the bodies of fighters and those who died
when Israel targeted their homes in various areas of Gaza, without any
mention of the approximate number of martyrs. Some fighters who went on
patrol have yet to return home, because it was only logical that dozens
would fall in this confrontation where Israel targeted homes.

Though the exact number of al-Qassam deaths remains unknown, Palestinian estimates
indicate that the total number of active fighters ranges between
20,000-30,000, which includes brigades, battalions and units, in similar
fashion to regular armies.

Another aspect of Hamas’ military capability relies on its use of rockets,
which, in this war, reached all the way to Haifa, northern Israel. In
this regard, Hamas official Abu Ali told Al-Monitor, “The al-Qassam
Brigades started this war right where it left off in the last war.
Shelling Sderot, Ashkelon and Ashdod is now a thing of the past; for
this time around, the brigades targeted Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa,
which means that they possess rockets with a range that surprised
Israel. Despite the use of the Iron Dome, Israel failed to prevent the
paralysis and chaos spreading to more than half of its territory and all
of its 5 million inhabitants.”

Abu Ali noted, however, that Hamas faces challenges in producing new
rockets due to the siege and destruction of the tunnels on Egypt’s
border.
“The al-Qassam Brigades face challenges to manufacture new rockets,
because materials used to make and develop them are barred from entering
the Gaza Strip, while Israel continues to demand that the whole of Gaza
be demilitarized. In this regard, Hamas became aware of the disturbing
possibility that Israel would win the game of attrition against its
fighters, by extending the confrontation and causing a shortage in
available rockets. But the al-Qassam Brigades anticipated this
eventuality and began reducing the daily number of rockets fired, while
continuing to threaten Israel’s home front.”

But the new development in this war was al-Qassam’s infiltration
behind Israeli lines, and its commando unit attack on Ashkelon’s shore
positions, 1 kilometer (0.6 mile) north of Gaza’s borders. These
operations were unprecedented and proved that Hamas troops had undergone
advanced training and used new intelligence measures and tactics premised on the element of surprise against the Israelis.

In response to Israeli measures to counter such operations, Abu Ali
said, “Israel’s targeting of border tunnels, its deployment of gunboats
along the Gaza coast and its use of surveillance airships and satellites
might hinder such operations in the future, if a cease-fire agreement
is not reached.”
But Hamas still has tricks up its sleeves, despite their military challenges, Abu Ali said.

“The brigades did not reveal their full weapons and military
capabilities; some of which became known as battles against Israel
progressed. The longer the fighting extends, the more new weapon systems
will be used. As such, the al-Qassam Brigades have made the Israeli
army aware that the continuation of the war will be met with further
surprises.”

*Adnan Abu Amer is
dean of the Faculty of Arts and head of the Press and Information
Section as well as a lecturer in the history of the Palestinian issue,
national security, political science and Islamic civilization at Al
Ummah University Open Education. He holds a doctorate in political
history from the Demashq University and has published a number of books
on issues related to the contemporary history of the Palestinian cause
and the Arab-Israeli conflict. On Twitter: @adnanabuamer1