Until the emergence of Özal at the core
of Turkey’s political sphere, the country’s strategic visions have evolved
through a series of three short–lived historical and ideological periods:

However, for the “Heart of the
Enlightened” (Aydınlar Ocağı), the Turkish regime that prevailed after the coup
of 1960, was a “pseudo–republic”, in which the religious authorities that were
controlled by the state had oppressed the rights of the Muslims. This was
intolerable, since there was not even a need to reassure the presence of Islam
in the context of this Turkish “pseudo–republic”, given the fact that the
majority of Turkey’s populations was Islamic.

This was something natural, particularly
in the light of the syndrome of the peace treaty of Sèvres, more specifically
in the light of the fear of Kurdish tendencies of secession and the preceding
Islamist ideological basis, which had developed already. This tendency was
amplified further by the US intervention in Iraq, which ended up in creating
the semi–official state of Iraqi Kurdistan. This was a major incentive for the
revitalisation of Turkey’s existentialist fear, which was further materialised
into interior Turkish policy, and, in particular, national security policy.
Consequently, as M. Ataman [[6]]
rightly suggests, neo–Ottomanism, after having initially been used as a
response to the internal challenge of the nationalist and ethnic conflict with
the Kurd separatists that were directed by PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan,
i.e. the Kurdish Labour Party), later infiltrated the foreign policy mentality
of the modern institutions that formulate Turkey’s policy. This fact has
contributed to the surfacing of Davutoğlu’s views on the neo–Ottoman Turkish
strategy, given that Turkey’s neighbours (Iran, Syria and Iraq) accumulated on
their respective territories, populations of ca. 12 million Kurds. These, added
to the 20 million Kurds of Turkey, make up an explosive population of an
ethnically and nationally conscious group, a critical mass that is particularly
threatening for the very existence of the modern Turkish state, according to
Davutoğlu’s views. Obviously, therefore, Islam has been considered the only
probable strong cohesive material, which could reverse this (dangerous for
Turkey) course of events. On the other hand, the creation of a big Kurdistan,
extending from Baghdad to the Black Sea, and from Alexandretta (İskenderun) to
Tauris (Crimea), which would create a projector of American power in the Middle
East and would obviously serve the security of the state of Israel, would certainly
downgrade Turkey’s “strategic role as an embankment” for Anglo–Saxon
aspirations. It would control 80 percent of the waters of the Middle East
(Tiger and Euphrates) and the best oil reserves of the region (in Mosul and
Kirkuk). Such a situation would serve neither the interests of Russia, nor of
Iran and Syria.

The entities of the historical,
geographical and cultural depth are fundamental in Davutoğlu’s approach, which
is apparently, albeit not truly, geopolitical. In the perception of the Turk
scholar, these are the fundamental components of strategic depth. Moreover,
Davutoğlu defines historical depth as the feature of a country being “in the
epicentre of [historical] facts” [[7]]. He acknowledges eight preceding empires, i.e.
Great Britain, Russia, Austria–Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and
Turkey, as being countries with a “historical depth”. In his comparative
analysis, he concludes that these countries face similar problems of
nationalism, of separatist tensions and of a general anti–imperialistic divide
in their corresponding regions. As a result of this, Turkey is characterised by
a significant “geographical depth”, owing to its “historical heritage” since
the Ottoman era. In relation to Turkey, he posits:

Surprisingly,
however, and surpassing the extensions of his methodology proper, he totally
ignores the Roman Empire, as well as the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, and
the naval empires of Spain and Portugal. The scholar’s historical lapsus is inconceivable
and pays no tribute to his title as scholar in Geopolitics, but rather only on
that of Mr. Erdoğan’s “political advisor”, indeed of an advisor who ignores
historical facts and, plainly, directs his leader onto erroneous paths, putting
the security of the entire region in danger. It should also be noted, on the
one hand, that Mr. Davutoğlu is forced, even with malaise, to acknowledge
Russia’s supremacy in the region of Caucasus and Central Asia, and, on the
other, he is henceforth obliged to take into consideration the specific
sensitivities of all the countries in the region, by trying to consolidate
Turkey’s geopolitical position in Central Asia (and Caucasus) [[9]].

Therefore, from a methodological as well from a
theoretical point of view, it is observed that the Turk scholar makes obvious
use of two of the three power distribution pillars of the Systemic Geopolitical
Analysis: of the pillars of Economy and Culture. On the subsurface, of course,
he also promotes the political pillar as part of the cultural one, and, in
addition, also the pillar of defence with his Mahanian strategic reference of
the choke points, as will be shown below.

Davutoğlu is a typical example of yet
another scholar on the international scene, of one who, beforehand, subjects
his work to epistemologically dilemmatic arguments: he fails to distinguish
between geopolitical analysis, on the one hand, and geo–strategic synthesis and
recommendation, on the other [[11]]. This is apparent in the scholar’s reference to the “ethical and
scientific dilemmas” of social scientists – i.e. to an issue that has already
been resolved theoretically by the modern neo–positivist research in social
sciences, at least on a tentative methodological basis. The Lacatosian
epistemological approach proves quite useful in the cases of these dilemmas.
This methodological dilemma appears in the Author’s Preface and is presented in
the social sciences as the [capability or non–capability] “of the researcher to
survive within his experimentation test–bench [[12]]. In other words, by proposing, as well as by promoting the
“researcher’s sense of belonging”, the scholar’s approach is reminiscent of the
successful, as well as rightful and caustic remarks of Panayiotis Ifestos in
relation to the stance of the publicist scholar, which ultimately bends towards
the nation–inspired end of the scale. This nation–inspired tendency, however,
would never be typical of a geopolitical analyst. The latter has the option to
assume a nation–inspired stance during the compulsory stage of Geostrategy,
during which he must come up with recommendations and proposals, by considering
the raison d’état of his country. Certainly, Davutoğlu’s stance in this respect is not
without a serious epistemological impact for his methodology in general and,
certainly, makes the scholar’s work part of the geostrategic epistemological
nexus of systematic and detailed recommendations, which are always
“nation–inclined and nation–centric recommendations”. In short, this is the
level of geostrategic recommendations, since they incorporate the national
perception, during the stage of their formation. We should also bear in mind
that geopolitical analysis comes without “recommendations”, and does not end up
in recommendations, but in models. Recommendations are the object of Geostrategy,
i.e. of the approach subsuming a nation’s perspective.

Davutoğlu tries to define the systemic
balances of power, in order to subsequently integrate Turkey into them and
study the country’s geostrategic present and future. To this end, he posits a
pseudo–mathematical “formula of national power”, making use of overtly generic
and exclusively qualitative coefficients, without proposing a process for their
quantification for the needs of his future model, not even a general one.
Moreover, in terms of purely mathematical formalism, this allegedly
mathematical formula has been proposed to accommodate an “optical–aesthetic”
result, considering for example that it is not necessary to put in parenthesis
the product of any real numbers (assuming that SM [Strategic Mentality], SP
[Strategic Planning] and PW [Political Will] can be expressed as real numbers,
i.e. as subsets of R0+) when
multiplied by a sum within a parenthesis! On the other hand, it is necessary to
propose a method for the quantification of terms, such as: Strategic Mentality,
Strategic Planning and Political Will. Such an attempt is not impossible.
Besides, in our view of systemic analysis, such figures are quantified, of
course with certain reservations. Simply put, we consider that it was necessary
to propose quantitative methods for converting the above–mentioned
coefficients. On the other hand, there is no theoretical speculation with
regard to the size of the “balance of power” underlying Davutoğlu’s work as a
whole. Considering the author’s intention to relate theoretically to the
parameters of power and to strategic planning, one would expect him to present
an analysis of the epistemological problem inherent in the term “balance of
power”, as well as of the definition of the “balance of power” in the context
of the traditional “comprehension–centred” approach, i.e. an issue that is
fundamental for Davutoğlu himself. This holds particularly true, considering
that, to this date, this view [[16]]
characterises the views of almost every politician, scholar and thinking
citizen.

For the sake of theoretical foundation of
our arguments, as well as in order to clarify things for the non–specialised
reader, it should be stressed that the international community of publicists
takes for granted the fact that no real scientific processing has ever been
achieved with regard to the terminology used and the conceptualisation of the
so–called “balance of power”, while the term itself has been strongly
criticised on the grounds that it creates a serious confusion of causality [[17]]. In this context, E. Haas suggests in agony that
there would be no difficulty in pursuing such an effort, had the term “balance
of power” been placed above philological, semantic and theoretical ambiguities.
Unfortunately, this is not the case [[18]]. Different
authors define the term differently. In the final analysis, there is no precise
scholarly definition, even though the term is the central concept in many, and
obviously distinct, theories of international relations [[19]]. Haas reminds us
also that Morgenthau, who had first suggested, used and supported the term
“balance of power”, and who has become Davutoğlu’s “theoretical ideal” had
established at least the following concepts in relation to this term [[20]]:

Haas, in turn, distinguishes at least…
eight distinct perceptions in the use of the term, of which Davutoğlu seems to
adopt a synthesis of three, as follows:

Spykman’s view that states struggle for a
hegemonial superiority and therefore are in more or less continual conflict
with each other “has for its natural corollary that this conflict, if it stops
short of total war, has to result in some sort of equilibrium” [[22]].
However, as Haas concludes, citing Spykman [[23]]:

such an equilibrium can never be stable,
because the objective of politicians is not “balance” but hegemony.

This
formulation of the term is often extended to include all the factors that
contribute to a state’s power and precisely, military installations, military
facilities and strategic positions.

He therefore concludes [[30]]
that

With regard to Professor Morgenthau, he
notes that in the American realist’s view, “the ‘imperialistic’ states tend to
line up against those defending the status quo, producing a balance in the process” [[31]].
Consequently, “it is often inherent in this formulation to consider Europe as a
great ‘confederation’ unified by homogeneous morals and religion and tied
together by international law” [[32]]. Moreover,
the struggle of the balance of power “is part of that system and tends toward
its preservation by avoiding the hegemony of a single member. And of course, it
is in this formulation that the analogy to the mechanical balance is most
frequently found” [[33]]. He then
cites Rousseau’s view [[34]] that the nations of Europe form among
themselves a tacit nation… The actual system of Europe has precisely the
degree of solidity which maintains it in a constant state of motion without
upsetting it. The balance existing between the power of these diverse members
of the European society is more the work of nature than of art. It maintains
itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it
re–establishes itself very soon on the other… This system of Europe is
maintained by the constant vigilance which observes every disturbance of the
balance of power.

As pertains to F. Ratzel, Haas suggests [[35]]
that the German geographer and geopolitician

Moreover,
with regard to Albert Sorel, Haas argues that the version of a universal law
has been processed further.

Sorel,
according to Haas [[40]],
holds that

In this
sense, Haas concludes [[42]]
that the balance
of power thus comes to mean the instinctive antithesis to the reasoned thesis
of raison d’état. Unconscious
moderation, temporarily, restrains deliberate greed. A general dialectic of
power relationships is thus created in which balances of power play a definite
part. However, no balance is permanent and is subject to change at a moment’s
notice. It guarantees neither peace nor law; in fact, it implies war and its
own destruction whenever a former counterweight state acquires sufficient power
to challenge the very balance which it was called upon to maintain.

Davutoğlu’s
analysis, as presented in the Introduction of his book, as well as the
terminology used for the concept of “natural” and “political” borders, for the
concept of the “Mittelage / strategically central region / core areas)” and for
the “struggle for space / Kampf um Raum” of
the competing nation–state actors, lead us toward perceiving that the author’s
theoretical foundation is on Ratzel’s theories of the Lebensraum [[43]].
His persistence on the notions of historical and geographical depth, in which
he further subsumes the latter to the former, is the exact copy of Ratzel’s
“third principle on the nature of the state”, suggesting that the “geographical
and historical context characterises the people who originate in a given
state”. According to Ratzel, there is an unbreakable link between a state’s
history–civilisation, geographical physical space and people. In his Political
Geography (Politische Geographie) Ratzel [[44]]
posits that

Also,
in the same extract of his Introduction, Davutoğlu refers to a “vision of
geopolitical frontiers” and for the “flexible/elastic borderline belt [[45]],
depending to the changes of dominance”, clearly suggesting and re–coining his
concept of Perception of space (Raumsinn), even though he uses the term in English and not in German, as one
would expect. Had he used the German term Grenzen (limits), as adopted both by Ratzel and Haushofer, the content of
his text would be much clearer [[46]]. Besides, Haushofer holds that borders are
bio–geographical entities not subjected to legal limitations. Davutoğlu upholds
this bio–geographical approach, starting from the initial text of his
Introduction.

For
insular countries, which he considers as having normal natural borders with the
outside world and the neighbouring Continental Space, the Turk scholar posits [[48]]:

It is
obvious that Davutoğlu has been influenced extensively by Haushofer’s principles,
indeed in their worst and most aggressive form, in a form never really thought
of by Haushofer himself.

Davutoğlu
estimates that Mahan’s views and Spykman’s geopolitical paradigm retain their
importance, regardless of the fact that in the modern geopolitical and
geostrategic conjuncture, whose characteristic is the rapid development of the
weapon of air–force and the geostrategic exploitation of the airspace and outer
space, and regardless of the geopolitical proposals of A.P. de Seversky
relating to the geopolitical criticality of the North Polar “decision area”.
Additionally, considering that by mixing the two paradigms (de Seversky and
Spykman), Central Earth or the Zone of the Axis [[50]] approaches the “decision zone”,
and, given that Turkey plays a crucial role in the Axis Zone, it will do the
same also in the new context. He also considers crucial the Rimland [[51]] during the Cold War era and
during the consistent rapid development of Nuclear Power, by focusing on the
importance of low–intensity conflicts and by remarking that “during the period
from World War II until the end of the Cold War, of the 50 in total
low–intensity conflicts in which the US intervened directly or indirectly, 30
manifested in the Rimland” [[52]].

As pertains to Turkey’s foreign policy in
Central Asia, Davutoğlu posits that it should take into consideration the
powers of the international system and their balances, on different levels:
international, continental, i.e. European and Asian, and regional. It is in
this context that he writes:

Davutoğlu’s detailed geographical
reference to sub–systems leaves no margin of doubt for the systemic character
of his methodological approach. On the other hand, it also leaves no margin of
misunderstanding about the prevalent role which the author wants his country to
play in relation to the “geostrategic breakup of the Rimland”, so that Ankara
be later in a position to negotiate, by itself, the security of the EU, of the
US, of Eurasia, of Central Asia, of Eastern Asia, of the Middle East and of the
Indian sub–continent. Of course, the use of NATO and the US in his
argumentation leaves no room for misconceptions with regard to his aim in using
the pillar of defence as a means of redistribution of power in the
international geographical super–system/super–complex.

When it comes to Greece, Davutoğlu cynically
defies his theory of “zero frictions with the neighbours”, referring to the
“choke point” of the Dardanelles.

Three fundamental questions arise out of
this repugnance. First: which is the threat for internal security and integrity
of these nation–state entities? Second, which is Turkey’s influence on the
non–completion of the Russia – Burgas (Bulgaria) – Alexandroupolis (Greece,
Thrace) pipeline? Third, to what extent does Davutoğlu think that his use of
the designation “Macedonia”, to describe FYROM, reduces tensions between his
country and Greece?

It is obvious why, in the context of the
above–mentioned geostrategic Turkish context, Ankara, invests in nautical bases
in Albania, why it insists on being involved as a “protecting power” of
Bosnia’s interests, and why it has recognised FYROM as “Macedonia”.

The following citation from Davutoğlu’s
book is clear, as to his real intentions and meanings, and more in particular,
as to his conceptualisation of the “zero frictions with Greece”: “Effort is
being put so that Turkey becomes accustomed to experience, on a regular basis,
tensions with Greece and Syria – this corresponds to a heavyweight wrestler’s
training, to confront medium–weight class wrestlers [sic] [[69]].
The consequence of this is that the country cannot fully exploit its potential.
Turkey is now obliged to be upgraded so that, having attained a higher class,
it may consider its relations with these countries as inferior elements and
exercise only policies from above, vis–a–vis these countries” [[70]].

As pertains to Davutoğlu’s strategic
planning in relation to Cyprus, the cynicism of the toughest classical school
of Geopolitics is explicit:

The scholar’s persistence on
Ratzel–inspired theoretical approaches (which are totally realistic, from a
geostrategic point of view) becomes clear also at this point of his
geostrategic planning. His preference is absolutely logical, given that he
places Turkey at the centre of the Arab–Muslim and Balkan–Muslim world.
Geographically speaking, the said placement in the specific subsystems (the
Balkans and the Greater Middle East) necessitates perceiving the neo–Ottoman
Turkey as located in the centre of Haushofer’s Euro–African N–S zone, so that
Ankara can exercise the influence potentially offered to it by the Islamic
geopolitical factor, to the North and to the South alike. The Ratzelian entity
that dominates the scholar’s thought, in addition to the concept of Lebensraum,
is that of Verkehr (circulation), indeed in its Haushoferian extensions. He considers
merchandise transports as a means to exercise control over the actual trade
flows and, consequently, over their respective money flows. He proceeds by
extending this control as a tool of dominance, from the part of the controlling
ethnic state actor, on the remaining actors of each geographical complex. Let
us examine some examples.

This geostrategic approach by Davutoğlu,
in relation to the Greek geostrategic provisions, adopts once again processes
of expansionism and conflict, by utilising the geopolitical cultural pillar.
From a methodological perspective, the author, always within the classical Ratzelian
and Haushoferian frame of thought, proposes the geostrategic tool of transport
axes as a means to project the neo–Ottoman power in the Balkans and, of course,
towards Greece. He posits: “The Turkish and Muslim minorities living in
Bulgaria, in Greece, in Macedonia [sic], in the Sanjak, in Kosovo and in
Romania are important elements of Turkey’s Balkan policy”. It is clear that the
Turk Foreign Minister refers to the instrumental use of the said minorities,
existent or non–existent, for Turkey’s power projection in the Balkans, through
destabilisations in the interior of the Balkan (and not only Balkan) countries.
In this geostrategic context, the Turk Foreign Minister defines two long– and
short–term targets for Turkey’s foreign policy in the Balkans, as follows: (i)
the strengthening of Bosnia and Albania; and (ii) the creation of an
international legal framework that will place under its protection the ethnic
minorities of the region. Further, by placing Turkey’s power projection
mechanism in the said geostrategic construct, the scholar explains with a
disarming clarity that “in this legal framework, Turkey must always opt for
ensuring guarantees that will allow it to intervene in matters related to the
Muslim minorities of the Balkans”. Leaving no doubt on how Mr. Davutoğlu and
the neo–Ottoman Turkey perceive legality, he states in the very same clause
that “the legality of the intervention in Cyprus, being an impressive example
for the modern era [[80]],
was made possible in such a legal framework.”. He therefore leaves absolutely
no margin to any Kantian idealist or supporter of democratic ideals of the
modern neo–Ottoman Turkey to assume or understand anything else, on the more
peaceful end of the scale. However, he attributes relevant intentions of a
geostrategic character also to Greece, suggesting that Athens purports to
achieve such aims in the Balkans through the Ecumenical Patriarchate – an
institution of which the ecumenical character he rejects! Similarly, he
discovers Russian and Greek claims in the Straits, which he can only fend off
with the above–mentioned Balkan policy of the Turkish–Muslim minorities [[81]]!
His analysis is formulated by (rightly) stressing the consistency of the rise
of colonialism for the geo–complex of the Middle East, which for Davutoğlu
“held a very important position on the communication arteries between the
colonial empires and their colonies” [[82]].
Also, he does not conceal Haushofer’s approach, which he deems to be correct:
“Haushofer, who showed the way to Hitler” [[83]].
It is an approach which, for Davutoğlu, had already been justified by
Napoleon’s attack on Egypt (Suez) when the French “leader who took action
aiming at world dominance” was heading towards India…

In his “apparently geopolitical”, but
basically ethnocentric geostrategic vision, Davutoğlu combines two geographical
areas: “From the North, the area of N. Caucasus, up to the South, in Kuwait”
and “the southern side of Central Asia”. He stresses that their participation
in the Islamic Civilisation “provides common elements to this imaginary
community” [[84]], which is full of contradictions between the internationally
recognised areas and the de facto reality [[85]].
He thus raises the status of the unity of the Islamic Umma to that of an “ideal
geopolitical structure”, in other words of the System/Geographical Complex, in
the context of which he observes the action of the fundamental geopolitical
factor, disfavouring the concept of “Nation–State”. The only nation–state
entity which Davutoğlu accepts –in political and in ethnic terms– is the
neo–Ottoman Turkey. This is of course considered a major contribution to “world
civilisation by modern Turkey” and is defined by Davutoğlu as a “cultural
aperture” aiming to “annul the geo–cultural rejection of Turkey [in
Huntington’s and in Brezinski’s terms]” [[86]].
Turkey, therefore, “owing to the experience it has gained from its own
civilisation” will preserve the hegemony of the neo–Caliphate imperial
formation, to which Davutoğlu aims and which he scrupulously plans and
promotes. And it does so, without ever considering the objections of Iran and
Saudi Arabia, as the true leading powers of the Shiite and the Arab–Muslim
Sunnite world, respectively. Consequently, he does so without attempting a
realistic analysis of undoubtedly existing elements competing his
“geopolitical–like”, but not geopolitical, analyses.

Consequently, the lack of an
Ottoman/Turkish diplomatic tradition of an analogous size is obvious: it should
be directed to Asia. Coming to the analysis of the second reason of
“unreadiness”, Davutoğlu mentions that “the ideological reason is no other than
the continuous effort for Westernisation, which was modelled on Europe”. It is
therefore understood that the role of Central Asia, being a geostrategic target
and a “vital space” [[106]]
for Turkey, had been degraded during the 20th century. The importance of the
“ideological reasoning” is supported, according to Davutoğlu, by a further
parameter, which is related to the characteristics of the post–Cold War period:
“The static perception of the bipolar world, the splints of ideology, as well
as the supremacy of the two super–powers in strategic decision–making, did not
leave margin for different ideological and strategic approaches” [[107]].

There are important similarities, at this
point, with Özal’s geostrategic vision, as it was presented by the late T.
Özal, as Dr. Ilias Iliopoulos points out [[110]].
Özal unreservedly “promoted the said geographical region [NB: of Central Asia]
to a ‘natural and historical area of Turkish influence’” and referred to “the
historic opportunity of Universal Turkism” [[111]],
in view of the detachment of Central Asia from Moscow.

Always within the same ideological
framework, Davutoğlu does not hesitate to create an Islamic “Eurasian
identity”, which he sees extending “from Albania to Kazan, from Bosnia to
Chechnya, from Crimea to Tajikistan” [[119]].
Also, he does not hesitate to postulate a fundamental hostility between this
“Islamic Eurasian identity” and the “Slavic and Russian influence”. He writes:
“The most important element that can eliminate the Slavic and Russian influence
in these areas is the opponent cultural [[120]]
force of defence offered by the Islamic identity [[121]].
He continues his argument, once more by attributing “national minority
characteristics” to the “Eurasian Islamic identity”. He writes: “Perceiving the
common fate of these communities makes Islamic identity part of a common
perception of minority”. It is therefore simple: On the one hand, he proposes
the clash of the two identities, and, on the other, he organises the Islamic
Eurasian communities into a common national minority entity. This is of course
a gross oversimplification, which however leaves no doubt about Davutoğlu’s
intended aim, i.e. the projection of all sorts of Turkish power in Eurasia,
through the invention of “Islamic Eurasianism” and of the Turkish neo–Ottoman
vehicle. In other words, Davutoğlu proposes a geostrategic–like conflict
between the Eastern–Orthodox dogma of the Slavo–Russian element and the
Islamic–Eurasian element! Not quite what one might regard as “peaceful
perception”, coming from a scholar advocating the theory of “zero frictions
with the neighbours”!

Consequently, the reasonable question,
how would these strategic aims of Turkey be achieved in Asia, is answered
specifically, and in a somewhat complex manner, by Mr. Erdoğan’s Advisor.
According to Mr. Davutoğlu, Turkey needs:

The requirement for Turkey is clear,
according to Davutoğlu: “Turkey’s geopolitical position necessitates the
planning of dynamic policies with many orientations, that are capable of
utilising all sorts of options, and not of static policies, depending on the
strategic priorities of various other actors [[123]].
Turkey is entering into the present dynamic and translational period, holding a
position that is by far advantageous in the New Order, as will be formed by the
countries that are capable of utilising and proving strategic consistency and
flexibility” [[124]].