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Γενικά θέματα , Τουρκία 12 Σεπτεμβρίου 2012

International Crisis Group ICG’s report: Turkey, The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement

International Crisis Group ICG’s report: Turkey, The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement

Europe Report N°21911
Sep 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey’s Kurdish conflict is becoming more violent,
with more than 700 dead in fourteen months, the
highest casualties in thirteen years. Prolonged
clashes with militants in the south east,
kidnappings and attacks on civilians suggest
hardliners are gaining the upper hand in the
insurgent PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The
government and mainstream media should resist the
impulse to call for all-out anti-terrorist war and
focus instead, together with Kurds, on long-term
conflict resolution.


There is need to reform oppressive laws that jail
legitimate Kurdish politicians and make amends for
security forces’ excess. The Kurdish move­ment,
including PKK leaders, must abjure terrorist attacks
and publicly commit to realistic political goals.
Above all, politicians on all sides must legalise
the rights most of Turkey’s Kurds seek, including
mother-language education; an end to discriminatory
laws; fair political representation; and more
decentralisation. Turkey’s Kurds would then have
full equality and rights, support for PKK violence
would drop, and the government would be better
placed to negotiate insurgent disarmament and
demobilisation.

The government has zigzagged in its commitment to
Kurds’ rights. The ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) initiated a “Democratic Opening” in
2005, but its commitment faltered in 2009. At times,
AKP leaders give positive signals, including
scheduling optional Kurdish lessons in school and
agreeing to collaborate in parliament with other
parties on more reforms. At others, they appear
intent on crushing the PKK militarily, minimise the
true extent of fighting, fail to sympathise with
Kurdish civilian casualties, openly show their deep
distrust of the Kurdish movement, do nothing to stop
the arrest of thousands of non-violent activists and
generally remain complacent as international
partners mute their criticism at a time of Middle
East turmoil.

Contradictory signals have also come from the
Kurdish movement, including leaders of legal
factions and the PKK, which is condemned in Turkey
and many other countries as a terrorist
organisation. They have made conciliatory
statements, tried to stick to legal avenues of
association and protest in the European diaspora and
repeatedly called for a mutual truce. At the same
time, few have disavowed the suicide bombings, car
bombs, attacks on civilians and kidnappings that
have increased in 2012. Hardliners promote the armed
struggle, radical youth defy more moderate leaders,
and hundreds of young men and women volunteer to
join the insurgency. European and U.S.
counter-terrorism officials still accuse the PKK of
extortion and drug dealing. Mixed messages have
convinced mainstream public opinion that Turkey’s
Kurds seek an independent state,www.ekurd.net

even though most just want full rights within
Turkey. The Kurdish movement needs to speak with one
voice and honour its leaders’ commitments, if it is
to be taken seriously in Ankara and its grievances
are to be heard sympathetically by the rest of the
country.

Finding the way to a settlement is hard, as
terrorist attacks continue and the PKK mounts
increasingly lengthy offensives. Turmoil in
neighbouring Syria, where a PKK-affil­iated group
has taken control of at least one major Kurdish area
near the border with Turkey, worries Ankara and may
be inflating the insurgents’ sense of power. Some on
both sides are talking again of winning militarily
and seem to have accepted many hundreds of dead each
year as the cost, even though after nearly three
decades of inconclusive fighting, public opinion
among Turks and Kurds alike increasingly concedes
that military action alone will not solve their
mutual problem.

What has been missing is a clear conflict resolution
strategy, implemented in parallel with measured
security efforts to combat armed militants, to
convince Turkey’s Kurds that their rights will be
gradually but convincingly extended in a
democratising Turkey. Now is a good time for this to
change. An election (presidential) is not expected
for two years. A new constitution is being drafted.
The AKP has a secure parliamentary majority. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should seize the
opportunity to champion democratic reforms that
would meet many of the demands voiced by most of
Turkey’s Kurds. This would not require negotiations
with the PKK, but the prime minister should engage
with the legal Kurdish movement, take its grievances
into account and make it feel ownership over
reforms.

Major misapprehensions exist on the question of what
the Kurdish movement is and what it wants. The
actions recommended below would move the conflict
closer to resolution than military operations alone.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To establish an environment for progress

To the Turkish government and the leaders of the
Kurdish movement:

1. Work toward a ceasefire, urge insurgents to stop
attacks, avoid large-scale military operations,
including aerial bombings, and stand up to pressure
for ever-stronger armed responses.

2. Urge the PKK to rein in factions that attack and
kidnap civilians, plant bombs and trash property or
throw Molotov cocktails in demonstrations, and to
pledge not to use a ceasefire to rearm, resupply or
relocate. The security forces must limit aggressive
crowd control methods, including tear or pepper gas,
to an absolute minimum.

Even in the absence of a ceasefire

3. Address the legitimate, broad demands of Kurdish
society for mother-language education, the lowering
of national election thresholds, more decentralised
local government and removal of discriminatory
ethnic bias in the constitution and laws.

4. Change the Anti-Terror Law, Penal Code and other
legislation to end the practices of indefinite
pre-trial detention and prosecution of thousands of
peaceful Kurdish movement activists as “terrorists”,
and ensure that non-violent discussion of Kurdish
issues is not punished by law.

5. Help inform public opinion about the
international legitimacy of multi-lingualism in
education, ethnic diversity and wider powers for
local government.

6. Use the parliament and, in particular, its
constitutional reform commission to facilitate
discussion between political parties on reform and
assure wide buy-in.

7. Make public a package of measures for
reintegration and retraining of former Kurdish
insurgents, once the time comes to agree on full
demobilisation.

To leaders of the Kurdish movement:

8. Clarify what reforms Kurds want in language,
education and public life; codify ideas for
decentralisation or devolution; identify precisely
which laws and constitutional articles should be
changed; commit to these reforms, advocate for them
in parliament and make a determined effort to
explain them to mainstream Turkish opinion.

9. Stop demanding a “self-defence militia” in
Kurdish-speaking areas, end any kind of illegal
political organisation in Turkey that could be
construed as a parallel state and remain committed
to ending the fighting and disbanding insurgent
units.

To Turkey’s allies and friends, notably the U.S.,
Canada, UK, Ireland and Spain:

10. Engage with the Turkish government and opinion
leaders to share experiences of defusing ethnic,
linguistic, and regional tensions, including through
travel programs for officials, politicians and
opinion-makers from all relevant sides and parties
in Turkey.

11. Continue to encourage Turkey to abide by its
international commitments to protection of minority
rights, freedom of expression and access to a fair
trial without extended periods of pre-trial
detention.

Copyright ©, respective
author or news agency,
International Crisis Group (ICG) |
crisisgroup.org   
http://www.ekurd.net

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